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The Self-Reference Effect in Memory: A Meta-Analysis 
Cynthia S. Symons 
Houghton College 
Blair T. Johnson 
Syracuse University 
In this review, the authors examine the basis for the mnemonic superiority hat results from relating 
material to the self. A meta-analysis confirms the expected self-reference effect (SRE) in memory, 
with self-referent encoding strategies yielding superior memory relative to both semantic and other- 
referent encoding strategies. Consistent with theory and research that suggest self-reference (SR) 
produces both organized and elaborate processing, the SRE was smaller (a) when SR is compared 
with other-reference (OR) rather than semantic encoding and (b) when the comparison tasks promote 
both organization a d elaboration. Thus, the SRE appears to result primarily because the self is a 
well-developed and often-used construct that promotes elaboration and organization of encoded 
information. The authors discuss the implications ofthese and other findings for theories of the SRE 
and for future research. 
Throughout the history of psychology, researchers have used 
the self as a central part of their explanations of various phenom- 
ena (see Banaji & Prentice, 1994; G. T. Greenwald & Pratkanis, 
1984; and James, 1890). A large body of research suggests that 
the self-structure is unique, relative to other concepts (e.g., those 
about other people; see Kihlstrom et al., 1988; Markus, 1977; 
and Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977), in its motivational nd 
affective implications as well as in its structure and content. 
Social psychologists have long posited an important affective 
role for the self-concept (e.g., C. W. Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 
1965; M. Sherif & Cantril, 1947). More recently, appraisal 
theories of emotion have emphasized the phenomenological im-
portance of the self in the interpretation f events and the re- 
suiting effect on emotions (Fiske & Taylor, 1991 ). From a moti- 
vational standpoint, examples of the self's pervasive influence 
abound. For example, the tendency to attribute another person's 
behavior to dispositional factors but one's own behavior to 
situational factors presumably occurs because the self dominates 
one's phenomenal perspective (Ross & Nisbett, 1991; Storms, 
1973). Similarly, both self-serving biases and defense mecha- 
nisms have been attributed to self-protective or self-enhancing 
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motives (cf. Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Maddi, 1989). The motiva- 
tional influence of the self in persuasion is evident when people 
resist persuasive appeals because of self-presentational concerns 
(Johnson & Eagly, 1989). Indeed, self-attention theory 
(Carver & Scheier, 1981 ) emphasizes that conformity of behav- 
ior to salient behavioral standards requires a focus on the self. 
Given the breadth of interest in self-related phenomena and 
theories thereof (e.g., Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; Markus & 
Wurf, 1987), it is not surprising that researchers have more 
recently examined whether self-related processes invoke differ- 
ent memory stores (Klein & Loftus, 1993) and the extent o 
which the self-structure can be distinguished from structures 
about others (e.g., Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991). In 
addition, research on self-schematicity (Markus, 1977; Mar- 
kus & Wurf, 1987) demonstrates that the content of self- 
schematic domains can have a wide variety of motivational, 
affective, and mnemonic consequences. 
The focus of this article is on these purportedly unique mne- 
monic aspects of the self. Several researchers have argued that 
the self-structure in memory is unique relative to other concepts 
by virtue of its superior elaborative and organizational proper- 
ties as well as its frequent use in information processing (e.g., 
Kihlstrom et al., 1988; Maki & Carlson, 1993; Markus, 1977; 
Rogers et al., 1977; Singer & Kolligan, 1987). If the self indeed 
has superior elaborative and organizational properties, then in- 
formation actively related to the self should be better emem- 
bered than information that is processed in other ways (e.g., 
the relating of information to someone lse or the processing 
of words for meaning). Researchers who initially obtained this 
pattern labeled the phenomenon the self-reference effect (SRE; 
Rogers et al., 1977). Although many subsequent studies found 
superior ecall following self-reference (SR; e.g., Bellezza, 
1984; Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; Maki & McCaul, 1985), other 
research suggest that the SRE was not so robust. Specifically, 
other kinds of non-SR processing appeared to promote memory 
as well as or better than SR (e.g., Bellezza & Hoyt, 1992; 
Keenan & Baillet, 1980; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Lord, 1980). 
These conflicting study findings led Higgins and Bargh (1987) 
to conclude that "self-reference is neither necessary nor suffi- 
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cient for memory of input to be facilitated in comparison to a 
semantic orientation task" (p. 392). Moreover, after 2 decades, 
researchers seem divided between those who are willing to attri- 
bute the SRE to special mnemonic properties of the self (e.g., 
Maki & McCaul, 1985; Rogers et al., 1977) and those who are 
not (e.g., Brown, Keenan, & Potts, 1986; Klein & Kihlstrom, 
1986). 
These inconsistencies were the impetus for our meta-analytic 
investigation. The first important question we address is whether 
SR tends to facilitate memory more effectively than other encod- 
ing tasks. That is, how consistently robust is the SRE? By ad- 
dressing this question, we provide an empirical test of conclu- 
sions by narrative reviewers (e.g., Higgins & Bargh, 1987) that 
variation in the results of SRE studies imply that it is not SR 
per se that facilitates memory. Our second and more important 
question concerns the conditions under which the SRE is most 
likely to occur. That is, assuming that SRE reviewers were cor- 
rect to conclude that studies' findings were inconsistent, we feel 
that it is most important to detail methodological features of. 
SRE studies that can be used to account for these inconsisten- 
cies. Obviously, such explanations represent the most theoreti- 
cally interesting aspect of this investigation. 
In this article, we adopt he perspective that the SRE results 
primarily because the self is a well-developed and often-used 
construct in memory that promotes both elaboration and organi- 
zation of encoded information--a perspective first advanced by 
Klein and Loftus (1988). The respective roles of elaboration 
and organization i  the SRE have been discussed by several 
researchers (e.g., A. G. Greenwald & Banaji, 1989; Klein & 
Kihlstrom, 1986; Klein & Loftus, 1988). In general, these re- 
searchers emphasized the role of ordinary memory processes, 
which leads to the conclusion that there is nothing special or 
unique about SR that renders it more effective as a mnemonic 
device than other encoding tasks. According to Klein and Loftus, 
although SR may be ordinary in the sense that it can be ex- 
plained by these properties, it is distinguished from many other 
comparison tasks (e.g., synonym judgments) in the sense that 
SR promotes both elaboration and organization simultaneously, 
resulting in a mnemonic advantage. However, only Klein and 
Loftus's study provides empirical support for the joint elabora- 
tion-organization model. Their findings imply that, across all 
the studies in the literature, SR tends to result in superior mem- 
ory compared with tasks that promote either organization or 
elaboration separately (e.g., a synonym judgment task) but not 
combined. 
We further submit hat, to the extent hat SR is spontaneous 
or habitual (e.g., Markus, 1977), the major benefit of SR lies 
not in its ability to invoke organizational or elaborative pro- 
cessing per se but rather its likelihood to spontaneously create 
matching between encoding and retrieval conditions (see Wells, 
Hoffman, & Enzle, 1984). This effect distinguishes the SR task 
from other tasks and may be the primary reason why it promotes 
memory more than other kinds of processing in the typical 
incidental learning situation. 
This study provides a meta-analytic integration of the SRE 
literature that allows an examination of the consistency and 
generality of the SRE and the conditions under which it is likely 
to occur. Furthermore, it provides ameta-analytic est of the joint 
roles of elaboration and organization. Specifically, we present 
evidence that the SRE occurs as a result of two features of the 
experimental task in a typical SRE study: (a) the nature of the 
comparison task (person-reference vs. semantic processing) and 
(b) the likelihood that the semantic or other-reference (OR) 
comparison task promotes both organization and elaboration. 
First, we show that comparisons that involve person reference 
(e.g., SR vs. OR) have smaller SREs relative to SR- versus 
semantic-encoding comparisons. Even more interesting, we 
show that comparisons of SR versus OR appear to be sensitive 
to certain task parameters (e.g., expectation of a test) that do 
not affect comparisons ofSR with semantic processing. In addi- 
tion, we show that the mnemonic advantage following SR tends 
to diminish when SR is compared with encoding tasks that 
invoke memory structures, which resemble the self in terms of 
the amount of development and use (e.g., OR tasks in which 
the target is very well known). Second, we show that, when the 
task compared with SR is judged to promote both elaboration 
and organization of stimulus words, the SRE is smaller than 
when the comparison task promotes only organization (rela- 
tional processing) or only elaboration (item-specific processing; 
Klein & Loftus, 1988). 
Historical Overview of SRE Research 
In a seminal pair of studies, Rogers et al. (1977) extended 
the depth of processing (DOP) paradigm (Craik & Tulving, 
1975) to the realm of the self. The basic strategy of the DOP 
paradigm is to compare the responses produced by encoding 
tasks that are presumed to differ in depth, or extensiveness, of 
processing (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1979). Essentially, DOP the- 
ory assumes that recall is a function of trace elaboration atthe 
time of encoding. Differences in responses to different asks, 
therefore, reflect underlying differences in the processes used 
to encode stimulus materials, uch as word lists. DOP research- 
ers had already demonstrated that semantic-encoding tasks 
( "Does the word mean the same as xxx?" ) resulted in superior 
recall compared with phonemic ("Does the word rhyme with 
xxx?") or structural encoding ("Does the word have capital 
letters?") tasks (e.g., Craik & Tulving, 1975). Rogers et al. 
used these standard DOP encoding tasks and added a new one, 
an SR task (i.e., "Does the word describe you?"). Showing 
that memory was even better for the SR condition than the 
semantic condition, Rogers et al. concluded that the self acts as 
a "superordinate schema" (p. 686) to facilitate ncoding and 
retrieval of the information. 
Researchers in subsequent s udies generally confirmed that 
SR produces uperior memory relative to semantic encoding. 
These researchers obtained an SRE with different (a) SR-encod- 
ing tasks (e.g., self-descriptiveness, autobiographical retrieval, 
imagery; Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Brown et al., 1986); (b) to- 
be-remembered materials (e.g., traits, nouns, prose; Bellezza, 
1984; Klein & Loftus, 1988; Maki & McCaul, 1985; Reeder, 
McCormick, & Esselman, 1987); and (c) populations (e.g., 
children and adults, Pullyblank, Bisanz, Scott, & Champion, 
1985; participants with and without depression, Derry & Kuiper, 
1981). The SRE appeared to be a robust phenomenon and 
quickly surfaced in introductory social and cognitive psychology 
textbooks. 
However, along with those who found SREs, researchers also 
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obtained findings in which SR failed to facilitate memory better 
than other types of processing. Researchers soon observed that 
comparisons of SR tasks with semantic tasks were confounded: 
That SR denotes a social entity, whereas the semantic task does 
not, suggests that enhanced memory may be a mere artifact of 
this task feature (Bower & Gilligan, 1979). In an effort to solve 
this problem, researchers compared memory following SR to 
that following OR (e.g., "Does this word describe your 
mother?"). Studies usually showed that the SRE was reduced, 
if not eliminated entirely, when the target referenced in the 
comparison task was a highly familiar other (e.g., Bower & 
Gilligan, 1979; Kuiper, 1982; Kuiper & Rogers, 1979)• Further 
studies uggest other boundary conditions on the SRE. For ex- 
ample, the SRE is shown to be reduced or reversed when imag- 
ery tasks are used (Lord, 1980), the semantic omparison task 
is a desirability rating (Ferguson, Rule, & Carlson, 1983), or 
the semantic omparison task promotes organization (but the 
SR task does not; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986)• Despite these null 
findings and reversals, our narrative inspection of the literature 
suggests that the SRE appears more often than not. 
Self as a Cognitive Construct That Promotes 
Elaboration 
The most popular explanation of the SRE is that SR promotes 
elaborative processing of to-be-remembered information (Kee- 
nan, 1993; Rogers et al•, 1977)• Based on DOP theory, depth is 
equated with the extent or amount of processing that a stimulus 
receives, whereas elaboration involves item-specific processing 
(see Eysenck & Eysenck, 1979)• When a participant processes 
a word using elaboration, he or she attends to the specific mean- 
ing of the word and the semantic associations between the word 
and extra list material in semantic memory (Anderson & Reder, 
1979; Einstein & Hunt, 1980; Klein & Loftus, 1988). According 
to Klein and Loftus, the effect of this kind of processing is to 
provide multiple routes for retrieval and create an environment 
in which "inference-based reconstruction . . . [is supported] 
• . . in the event of retrieval failure" (p. 6). Exemplifying this 
elaboration perspective, Anderson and Reder (1979) theorized 
that 
it is not depth of processing per se that is important, but one's prior 
practice at making elaborations about various types of information 
and practice at interpreting the previously stored elaborations. The 
"better" processing is that which generates more elaborations of 
the input hat can be interpreted at retrieval . . . .  The instructions 
that can produce rich elaboration and the materials that can be 
richly elaborated must be defined with respect to the processor. The 
most critical determinant of retention is the number of elaborations. 
(p. 390) 
Anderson and Reder further argued that certain kinds of elabora- 
tions may be easier for some people because they are practiced 
habitually. This ease of processing that develops as a conse- 
quence of repeated elaborations suggests a connection to the 
memorial advantage of SR processing• Many researchers have 
concluded that processing information in a self-relevant way 
may be a "normal" processing mode (e.g., Catrambone, 
Beike, & Niedenthal, 1996; Catrambone & Markus, 1987; 
Fong & Markus, 1982; Wells et al., 1984)• They argued that 
the self is exceptionally well learned and often used (Kihlstrom, 
1993; Maki & Carlson, 1993) and that, indeed, people generally 
possess more expertise about hemselves than about any other 
structure in memory (Markus, 1977). Thus, the evidence sug- 
gests that SR constitutes a processing task that receives a great 
deal of practice. An important consequence of the facility with 
which one elaborates on information using SR is that such 
processing can become xceptionally efficient. 
Meta-analytic predictions for SR-semantic and SR- OR com- 
parisons. Given the foregoing logic, we expected the results 
of our investigation to show that SR should produce superior 
memory when compared with tasks that promote less elabora- 
tion. Proponents ofthe elaboration hypothesis argued that, under 
most circumstances, SR results in greater elaboration of the 
stimulus word than that achieved by a semantic omparison 
task (e.g., Rogers et al., 1977). Thus, based on the elaboration 
hypothesis, the SRE should be smaller (or disappear altogether) 
when studies use semantic-encoding tasks that engender greater 
elaboration and larger when the semantic-encoding tasks engen- 
der less elaboration than the SR. 
On the one hand, it is difficult to think of tasks that would 
promote more elaboration than SR when the stimulus words are 
trait adjectives because trait dimensions are the most common 
attributes along which people judge themselves (Maki & 
McCaul, 1985; see Markus & Kitayama, 1991 ). Thus, we might 
predict hat when traits are used as stimulus items, SR should 
always result in memory superior to that of a semantic task. On 
the other hand, such mnemonic superiority should increase to 
the extent that a person is practiced at making such elaborations• 
Certainly self-relevant judgments about traits are often prac- 
ticed, however, certain semantic judgments are also often used. 
In particular, people commonly identify certain trait adjectives 
as more socially desirable than other adjectives, a process that 
is part of socialization (Ferguson et al., 1983). We thus expect 
our meta-analysis to show that the act of judging a word for its 
desirability produces memory equivalent tothat of SR (Ferguson 
et al., 1983; cf. McCaul & Maki, 1984). Similarly, SR should 
theoretically facilitate processing of traits better than nouns be- 
cause it is more common for, people to judge themselves along 
trait dimensions than to judge, for example, which careers they 
have considered in the past (Maki & McCaul, 1985; cf. Klein & 
Kihlstrom, 1986)• Thus, on the basis of the elaboration hypothe- 
sis and findings that are consistent with it, we expect our meta- 
analysis to show that he SRE is larger for studies in the literature 
that used traits rather than nouns• 
Similar arguments hold with regard to SR versus OR tasks: 
To reference highly intimate others (e.g., one's mother) should 
result in more elaborations than to reference a less intimate 
other, presumably because laboration of information relevant 
to intimate targets is a highly practiced task undertaken many 
times before. This high degree of elaboration theoretically pro- 
motes superior memory because it increases the likelihood of 
additional retrieval routes at the point of recall. Thus, to process 
information about a highly intimate other ought to promote 
superior memory relative to that produced by reference to some- 
one less intimate• Elaboration of stimulus words during refer- 
ence to a highly intimate other (e.g., one's mother) is a fre- 
quently occurring task. It is conceivable that information about 
intimate others may be nearly as well known and well elaborated 
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as self information (Aron et al., 1991 ). Thus, to the degree that 
the target other is intimate, the SRE should less likely be ob- 
tained (e.g., Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Brown et al., 1986; 
Kuiper, 1982). Yet, because studies in this subliterature have 
not always used highly intimate target others (e.g., the experi- 
menter for the laboratory session), we still expect our meta- 
analysis to reveal a mnemonic advantage for SR conditions over 
OR conditions. When the rated target is highly intimate, how- 
ever, OR should result in memory of stimulus words nearly 
equivalent to that of SR. 
We should note that many researchers did not distinguish 
between familiarity and intimacy in their operationalizations of 
OR tasks. For example, in the literature, it is common to see, 
for example, Johnny Carson and one's mother described as 
highly "familiar" stimulus others. However, although both their 
mothers and Johnny Carson may be rated by research partici- 
pants as very familiar target others, participants are, of course, 
much more likely to have an intimate knowledge of their moth- 
ers. Although this may seem like a minor and admittedly obvious 
point, we present it because it has contributed to the perception 
of inconsistency in findings in the SRE literature. Consistent 
with the elaboration hypothesis, researchers have examined the 
degree to which representations of intimate others may overlap 
that of the self (e.g., Aron et al., 1991 ). One's memory structure 
about one's mother should obviously be much more elaborate, 
differentiated, and well known than a memory structure about 
Johnny Carson. Thus, representations about one's mother are 
theoretically more likely to promote recall equivalent to that 
evoked by SR. Later, we show that the distinction between 
familiarity and intimacy, as they are used in the literature, is 
important: Only intimacy predicts variation in effect sizes in 
the SRE literature. 
Encoding specificity. An important principle of memory is 
that elaboration at encoding cannot solely account for retrieval. 
A large body of literature asserts the importance of retrieval 
conditions as well as encoding conditions. Based on the encod- 
ing specificity principle (Fisher & Craik, '1977; Tulving, 1979; 
Tulving & Thompson, 1973), the best retention isobtained when 
retrieval conditions reinstate conditions that were present at en- 
coding. Wells et al. (1984) examined the effects of encoding- 
specific onditions on the SRE and showed evidence that partici- 
pants spontaneously reinstated SR conditions at retrieval. Nota- 
bly, even when encoding and retrieval conditions were matched 
(i.e., OR encoding was followed by an OR cue at retrieval), 
recognition memory was higher for the SR condition. This find- 
ing is consistent with DOP research (Fisher & Craik, 1977) 
that shows differences in recall across processing conditions 
despite matched encoding and retrieval conditions. These find- 
ings suggest that, even with matched conditions, encoding condi- 
tions have an effect. In the same way, SR encoding may promote 
better ecall than comparison processing conditions because it 
promotes SR retrieval (Wells et al., 1984) and more elaboration 
of stimulus words. 
In summary, the elaboration hypothesis predicts that, across 
the literature, SR should be superior to both semantic and OR 
processing. Moreover, if we extend the logic of the elaboration 
hypothesis, (a) in general, the SRE should be larger for studies 
that compared SR tasks with tasks that promote less elaboration; 
(b) within the class of studies that used SR and OR tasks, the 
SRE should be larger for low-intimacy targets than for high- 
intimacy targets; and (c) within the SR-semantic lass of com- 
parisons, SREs should be larger when studies used traits rather 
than nouns. 
Self as a Construct That Promotes Organization 
Ironically, a huge literature on the mnemonic effects of orga- 
nization predated the DOP perspective that elaboration is memo- 
ry's driving force (see Bousfield & Bousfield, 1966; and Mand- 
ler, 1967), but it has only more recently been brought o bear 
on the SRE (Klein & Klhlstrom, 1986). Organization is the 
process of grouping items together. It (a) is essentially relational 
processing in which words are grouped based on some set of 
semantic riteria (Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986); (b) results in 
attention to similarities between list words (Hunt & McDaniel, 
1993) as well as associations between the words and their cate- 
gory label (Battig & Bellezza, 1979; Klein & Klhlstrom, 1986); 
and (c) may take different forms (e.g., subjective organization 
or organizational strategies that are unique to the particular 
stimulus list or encoding situation; see Battig & Bellezza, 1979). 
According to Klein and Klhlstrom, organization facilitates recall 
in two ways. First, it encourages encoding of relationships be- 
tween list words that share the same category, resulting in the 
development of multiple retrieval paths. Second, the associations 
formed between the words and their category label allow the 
category label to act as a retrieval cue, thus facilitating recall. 
Klein and his colleagues rallied evidence to show that organi- 
zational processing also plays a role in the SRE (Klhlstrom et 
al., 1988; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Klein & Loftus, 1988; 
Klein, Loftus, & Schell, 1994). For example, Klein and Kihl- 
strom showed that organizational properties presumably inher- 
ent in a typical SR task could account for its mnemonic superior- 
ity relative to a semantic omparison task. They found that, 
when an SR task is compared with a semantic-encoding condi- 
tion designed to promote organization, the SRE disappeared. 
They concluded that organization was confounded with SR in 
the typical SRE paradigm. 
In-line with this reasoning, if an organizational principle un- 
derlies the mnemonic superiority of SR encoding, to the degree 
that a comparison task promotes organization (e.g., a categori- 
zation task), then the difference in subsequent recall following 
the two tasks should decrease. However, organization can take 
several forms (Battig & Bellezza, 1979). For example, it can 
occur because participants become aware of a category due to 
its size (Hunt & Seta, 1984), can be subjective, or could be 
deliberately induced by the experimenter (e.g., through a cate- 
gory-sorting task). Although it has been demonstrated that a 
self-descriptiveness judgment task can elicit organizational pro- 
cessing (e.g., Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986), no researcher has 
specifically examined the degree to which specific kinds of 
organizing strategies or styles of organizational processing natu- 
rally arise out of an SR task or affect the SRE. On the basis of 
Klein and his colleagues' findings (e.g., Klein & Kihlstrom, 
1986; Klein & Loftus, 1988), however, we can generally predict 
that, to the degree that SR processing elicits organization, recall 
should be greater than for a task that does not. Moreover, theoret- 
ically if both comparison tasks promote organization, to the 
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degree that SR results in more organization than the comparison 
task, an SRE should be observed. 
SR as Organized and Elaborative 
Under certain circumstances, either organization or elabora- 
tion may produce good recall or prove superior to the other. 
Although some researchers have discussed the idea that either 
organizational (relational) or elaborative (item-specific) pro- 
cessing may explain the mnemonic superiority of SR, only Klein 
and Loftus (1988) have performed an empirical test of the 
hypothesis that both elaboration and organization are invoked 
during SR. By doing so, they raised certain issues that had not 
been addressed directly in the SRE literature. The basic question 
that has driven investigations of SR is whether there is something 
inherent in the SR task that makes it likely to produce more 
recall than a semantic or OR task. The important focus that 
Klein and Loftus emphasized was the joint effects of elaboration 
and organization and the mnemonic advantages that occur when 
both processes are simultaneously invoked by a particular task. 
In a review in which they discussed the joint role of item- 
specific and relational processing across a wide range of cogni- 
tive phenomena, Hunt and McDaniel (1993) summarized the 
basic logic that appears in different domains of the memory 
literature, including Klein and Loftus's (1988) experiment. In
their article, Hunt and McDaniel discussed the idea that, when 
words are already related, similarities between words are natu- 
rally encoded uring comprehension a d attention to differences 
between the words (item-specific processing) facilitates mem- 
ory more than attention to similarities. However, when stimulus 
words are unrelated, differences between words are naturally 
encoded uring comprehension a d attention to similarities be- 
tween the words (relational processing) facilitates memory 
more than attention to differences (Einstein & Hunt, 1980; 
Hunt & Einstein, 1981 ). On the basis of this logic, Klein and 
Loftus (1988) hypothesized that, if organization underlies SR, 
then an SR task should have effects imilar to that of an organi- 
zational task. Thus, if the stimulus words are already related, 
then attention during comprehension is naturally drawn to rela- 
tionships between words and both organizational processing and 
SR should be redundant. In this situation, elaborative processing 
should facilitate more memory than organization or SR. Klein 
and Loftus further hypothesized that, if elaboration underlies 
SR, then an SR task should have effects imilar to an elaborative 
task. Thus, when words are unrelated, attention during compre- 
hension is naturally drawn to differences between words. In this 
situation, both elaboration and SR should be redundant and 
organization should serve to enhance recall more than either SR 
or elaboration. Klein and Loftus's results show a pattern that 
supports ajoint elaboration-organization explanation. Specifi- 
cally, when list words were related, SR resulted in effects imilar 
to elaboration: Both resulted in memory superior to organiza- 
tional processing. However, when the list words were not related, 
SR also resulted in effects similar to an organizational t sk. In 
this case, both SR and organizational t sks enhanced recall more 
than the elaborative task. Klein and Loftus, therefore, advocated 
what they called a "dual-processing approach" and concluded 
that both organizational and elaborative processing are invoked 
in an SR task. 
Given these ideas about he joint roles of relational and item- 
specific processing and consistent with Klein and Loftus's 
(1988) experiment, several predictions that distinguish SR from 
other kinds of processing arise. (a) SR tasks, which presumably 
promote both relational processing and item-specific processing, 
ought to promote better memory than any other task that pro- 
motes only one of these processes. (b) When list words are 
already related, an SR task should promote more memory than 
a task that promotes organization (because, when the list is 
related, organizational processing is redundant [Hunt & Ein- 
stein, 1981], and elaborative processing, theoretically inherent 
in an SR task, promotes optimal recall [ Klein & Loftus, 1988 ]). 
(c) Conversely, when list words are already unrelated, an SR 
task should promote more memory than a task that promotes 
elaboration (because, when the list is unrelated, elaborative pro- 
cessing is redundant [Hunt & Einstein, 1981], and organiza- 
tional processing, theoretically inherent in an SR task, promotes 
optimal recall [Klein & Loftus, 1988]). 
Meta-Analysis 
Design 
Boundaries for the sample of studies. We attempted to 
maintain in our sample only those studies that used the standard 
DOP incidental learning paradigm, in which an encoding (ori- 
enting) question is posed and a stimulus word is presented for 
the participant's judgment. By eliminating atypical studies from 
the sample, we were able to confine our recta-analysis to studies 
or portions of studies that were relatively consistent on all meth- 
odological dimensions except hose that are important for meta- 
analytic moderator testing (Johnson, 1989). Thus, we excluded 
studies that used unusual methodologies relative to the rest of 
our sample. For example, some studies involved the reading of 
passages of prose, which participants were instructed to read 
and relate to themselves as much as possible (e.g., Reeder et 
al., 1987). Other studies used atypical stimuli that were not 
similar to those used in most of our sample (e.g., faces; Mueller, 
Bailis, & Goldstein, 1979) or participants were not asked to 
recall stimuli n a manner that conformed to the vast majority 
of SRE studies. 
Theoretical plan. Our general plan for the meta-analysis 
was first to test our expectation that the SRE is significant yet 
inconsistent across all studies in the literature. We then planned 
to test our expectation that the SRE would be larger in studies 
where researchers compared SR with semantic encoding rather 
than SR with OR. Because most of our other hypotheses are 
specific to one or the other of these two general classes of 
studies, we then planned to examine our hypotheses separately 
within these two classes. Indeed, some moderators that we ex- 
amined could only be examined within one of the classes (e.g., 
type of semantic-encoding task). 
On the basis of Klein and Loftus's (1988) conceptualization 
of the joint effects of relational and item-specific processing, 
we expect our meta-analysis to show that the SRE is smaller 
when the comparison task is judged to elicit both relational and 
item-specific processing rather than either one or the other of 
the two processes. Thus, for example, the SRE should decrease 
as intimacy of a rated target increases because the rating of a 
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highly intimate other conceivably involves relational processing 
in which a highly organized domain in memory is referenced 
(see Sedikides, Olsen, & Reis, 1993) and item-specific pro- 
cessing that involves increasing degrees of elaboration as one's 
knowledge of the OR target increases. 
Exploratory analyses. On an exploratory basis, we exam- 
ined several other possible moderators of the SRE, which should 
prove of special interest to SRE researchers who have speculated 
about most of these dimensions. Indeed, in coding studies for 
their characteristics, we included any dimension of which we 
were aware that other SRE researchers had found to be plausible 
moderators of SRE magnitude. Because many of these modera- 
tors have been the subject of theoretical debate and the relevant 
studies have yielded quite inconsistent findings, it was difficult 
to make meta-analytic predictions about the moderators' roles 
in the SRE. Nonetheless, the exploratory moderators included 
(a)  specific aspects of the experimental situation (e.g., whether 
a distractor task was used and what the length of the stimulus 
presentation was ), (b)  dependent variable (free recall vs. recog- 
nit ion), (c)  design type (within vs. between subjects), and (d)  
memory load (i.e., amount of to-be-remembered material). We 
expect results for these dimensions to provide important clues 
regarding the basis of the SRE. Thus, for example, if the use 
of a distractor task has no impact on the SRE for semant ic -SR 
comparisons but increases the SRE for SR-OR comparisons, 
then it may be that OR tasks benefit more from rehearsal strate- 
gies, as some reseachers have argued (Kuiper & Rogers, 1979). 
Method 
Criteria for study inclusion. Our meta-analysis focuses on two com- 
parisons performed in the majority of SRE studies: (a) SR versus eman- 
tic encoding and (b) SR versus OR encoding. Studies had to meet wo 
criteria: 
1. Researchers had to manipulate encoding instructions by presenting 
participants with a task in which either (a) SR and semantic encoding 
or (b) SR and OR were compared. We generally included studies that 
presented traditional DOP paradigm encoding tasks; however, stud!es in 
which researchers did not use traditional tasks were included if we 
judged them to have manipulated the type of encoding in a relevant way, 
even though the task was not conventional (e.g., Mueller, Heesacker, & 
Ross, 1984). Both within- and between-subjects de igns were included. 
2. Acceptable dependent measures included free recall, recognition, 
or cued recall. Either adjusted or raw score means were acceptable; 
however, when both adjusted and raw score means were available, ad- 
justed means were used. The mere use of an SR trait descriptiveness 
task in a reaction-time paradigm was not sufficient for inclusion (e.g., 
Markus, 1977); the task had to specifically test the effects of type of 
encoding on some measure of recall or recognition. 
Study retrieval. A thorough search of the SRE literature was con- 
ducted to find as many studies as possible. We obtained studies through 
literature searches using PsycL1T (1974-1994) and by searching refer- 
ence lists of relevant articles. In addition, we searched for unpublished 
dissertations and conference papers and made specific attempts o contact 
researchers of unpublished studies to avoid publication bias. Only studies 
that were available as of June 1994 were included in the sample. 
Coding. We coded studies on several dimensions that were relevant 
for theoretical or exploratory purposes and on many more dimensions 
that were descriptive only. The theoretically relevant dimensions in- 
cluded (a) type of comparison (SR-semantic vs. SR-OR), (b) type 
of SR task (self-descriptive, autobiographical, imagery, associating self 
with nouns [e.g., body parts or boats], other), (c) type of semantic 
task (synonym decision, generate a definition, fits sentence, fits category, 
other), (d) relatedness of stimulus words (high, low, unable to rate), 
(e) type of stimuli presented (trait adjectives, nouns, other), (f) famil- 
iarity of the other-referent target (high, low, unable to rate), (g) intimacy 
of the other-referent target (high, low, unable to rate), and (h) type of 
processing promoted by the comparison task (relational, item-specific 
processing, or both). The exploratory dimensions included (a) type of 
dependent measure (free recall, cued recall, recognition), (b) design of 
study (within or between subjects), (c) nature of timing interval for 
retrieval measure (fixed, unlimited; recorded time if fixed), (d) type of 
OR task (descriptive, biographical, imagery, associated target other with 
nouns, other), (e) timing of stimulus presentation (fixed, variable based 
on response latency, variable based on experimenter judgment, other, 
unknown), (f) length of stimulus presentation, (g) duration of interval 
between task and retrieval, (h) presence of distractor task, (i) expecta- 
tion of a memory task (i.e., use of an incidental vs. an intentional 
learning paradigm), and (j) memory load (coded as number of words 
in the stimulus list). The merely descriptive characteristics ncluded (a) 
year of publication, (b) source of publication (journal, other publication, 
dissertation or master's thesis, unpublished), (c) source of participant 
population (undergraduate or other ), (d) percentage of male participants 
in the sample, (e) method to test participants (individual or group), (f) 
geographic area in which the study was conducted, (g) mode of stimulus 
presentation (index cards, monitor, projector, read by experimenter, 
booklet, tachistoscope, other), and (i) expectation of a retrieval test by 
participants (i.e., incidental or intentional learning paradigm). 
Computation of effect sizes. Effect sizes for the studies were re- 
corded, along with their significance and direction. In so far as possible, 
separate ffect sizes (gs) were computed for each relevant manipulation 
(i.e., SR vs. semantic encoding and SR vs. OR encoding) with the 
following formula: 
Mself  - -  Msemantic (other) g= 
SDpoo~ed 
where Ms,if is the mean recall for the SR-encoding condition, 
M~,,~tlc ~oth~r) is the mean recall for the semantic- (or OR-) encoding 
condition, and SDpoot~d is the pooled standard eviation (see Johnson, 
1989). We converted the gs to ds by correcting them for the bias that 
occurs, especially with small sample sizes (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). 
Some studies yielded multiple effect sizes because (a) more than one 
dependent measure was used (e.g., two different recall measures) or 
(b) several different levels of a variable were manipulated (e.g., several 
different arget others; Keenan & Baillet, 1980). The effect sizes were 
analyzed using standard meta-analytic techniques (Hedges & Olkin, 
1985; Johnson, 1989). 
Results 
Characteristics of studies. We began our analyses by sum- 
marizing the characteristics of studies reviewed in the meta- 
analysis. Table 1 shows the summary of study characteristics 
aggregated across all SRE studies and then across the two sub- 
sets of studies that represent he separate classes of (a) SR 
versus semantic manipulations and (b)  SR versus OR manipula- 
tions. Table 2 presents the calculated effect size (d)  for each 
study in our meta-analysis, along with its important study 
attributes. 
As Table 1 shows, studies in our meta-analysis (a)  were 
published relatively recently; (b)  were primarily published re- 
ports; (c)  tested 39 participants on average; (d)  tested partici- 
pants primarily from college populations; (e)  usually tested 
adults; ( f )  were primarily conducted in North America; (g)  
tended to test participants individually (75%),  with 24% using 
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group methodologies; (h) tended to use within-subjects (75%) 
versus between-subjects designs (25%); (i) had an average 
memory load of about 54 words, with studies in the SR versus 
OR class tending to have longer stimulus lists than the SR versus 
semantic class; (j) used trait words as stimuli more than nouns; 
(k) primarily used stimulus lists that contained unrelated words; 
(1) used a small number of encoding tasks on average, with SR 
versus OR studies tending to use more tasks than did SR versus 
semantic studies; (m) tended to present stimuli at a fixed rate 
or measure participants' reaction times; (n) used a variety of 
modalities to present stimulus materials, with the majority using 
computers; (o) tended to use free recall as the dependent mea- 
sure, with a small percentage using recognition and very few 
using cued recall; (p) tended to allow participants a fixed time 
period to respond uring the retrieval task; (q) were slightly 
less likely to use distractor tasks (47 % ) than not (53 % ) between 
presentation a d retrieval; and (r) tended to use an incidental 
learning paradigm (87%) in which participants did not expect 
a recall test rather than an intentional learning situation in Which 
testing was expected. 
Overall SRE. After summarizing study char~icteristics, we 
analyzed the entire set of SRE studies to test the hypothesis that 
SR results in greater memory than OR or semantic encoding. 
These analyses appear at the bottom of Table 1 and show that 
SR encoding does promote better ecall on average than other 
types of encoding, as evidenced by a mean weighted effect size 
that differed significantly from the 0.00 value that indicates 
exactly no effect, d = 0.50, 95% confidence interval (CI) = 
0.45-0.54. Also as expected, the assumption of homogeneity 
of effect sizes was rejected, Q(128) = 451.40, p < .0001. 
Consistent with the conclusion that study results were inconsis- 
tent, homogeneity could not be achieved until we discarded 34 
(26%) outlying effect sizes. The resultant mean effect size was 
still significant, d = 0.45, 95% CI = 0.39-0.50. Thus, the 
hypothesis of an overall SRE across the literature was supported, 
although its magnitude Varied considerably. 
Cross-Literature Models for SRE Magnitude 
Following the overall analysis, we fitted models using coded 
study characteristics to explain variation in effect sizes. With 
our first model, we examined whether the SRE varied as a 
function of studies' manipulation class (SR-semantic vs. SR- 
OR). As predicted, the SRE did vary as a function of manipula- 
tion class, with a significantly smaller SRE for the SR-OR 
versus the SR-semantic class (see Table 3). However, also as 
expected, each of these mean SREs was highly significant. Ef- 
fect sizes within each class were also found to be heterogeneous; 
it was necessary to remove 11 studies (18%) from the SR- 
semantic lass and 14 studies (20%) from the SR-OR class to 
achieve homogeneity. After removal of these studies, however, 
the resulting mean effect sizes were still significant (see Table 
1). Thus, results show that, although study effect sizes are 
inconsistent, the SRE does tend to occur when one compares 
SR encoding with semantic encoding and OR, as predicted. 
To test our hypothesis that the SRE would be smaller when 
the comparison task promotes both relational and item-specific 
processing, we performed a model test by collapsing across 
manipulation class. As the second model in Table 3 shows and 
as we predicted, when the comparison tasks used in studies in 
the literature promoted both relational and item-specific pro- 
cessing, the SRE was significantly smaller than when the com- 
parison task promoted either relational or item-specific pro- 
cessing. Within the class of studies that used tasks that were 
judged to promote both relational and item-specific processing, 
the effect sizes were homogeneous; moreover, this class differed 
significantly from the separate classes for relational and item- 
specific processing. However, the relational and item-specific 
classes did not differ significantly from each other. In all three 
classes, significant SREs were observed. 
Two continuous predictors--(a) time between encoding and 
memory tasks and (b) length of stimulus presentation--were 
significant predictors of the magnitude of SR effect sizes across 
the literature. Specifically, the SRE tended to increase as the 
time between the encoding and memory tasks increased and to 
decrease as the length of stimulus presentation grew longer. Note 
that the latter finding is based on the minority of studies that 
used fixed stimulus presentation times (i.e., k = 51 ). As Table 
4 shows, both of these pattems generalized across the two ma- 
nipulation classes. We next attempt to explain inconsistencies 
within the SR-semantic and SR-OR manipulation classes, 
respectively. 
Moderators of SR-Semantic Effect Size Magnitude 
Theoretical moderators. For the SR-semantic manipulation 
class, model tests for relatedness of stimuli reveal that studies 
using highly related stimulus items obtained a smaller mean SRE 
than those in the low-relatedness class (see Table 5 ). Indeed, the 
mean SRE in the high-relatedness class was not significant, and 
effect sizes in this class were consistent in contrast to the low- 
relatedness et in which a significant mean SRE occurred. 
A model for type of stimulus materials used shows that, con- 
sistent with the elaboration hypothesis, the mean SRE for studies 
that used traits was significantly greater than that produced in 
studies that used nouns or other types of stimulus materials (see 
Table 5; as Table 6 shows and as discussed below, this pattern 
also appears for the SR-OR subliterature). However, the mean 
SRE for both the traits and the nouns classes was significant. 
Effect sizes for both classes of stimulus materials were 
inconsistent. 
The next model was assessed to examine whether the seman- 
tic-encoding task used was related to SRE magnitude. Although 
there were eight classes of tasks in all, a few clear differences 
did emerge (see Table 5 for specific differences). Consistent 
with the organization hypothesis, the mean SRE for the fits- 
category class was marginally smaller than the mean SRE for 
the synonym judgment class (p = .057); however, it was not 
smaller than other classes of semantic tasks. Also, studies that 
used desirability ratings tended not to observe asignificant mean 
SRE, in contrast to studies in the other classes. Studies that used 
tasks in which participants had to generate definitions and those 
that used synonym judgment tasks obtained significantly arger 
mean SREs than those that used desirability ratings. However, 
desirability judgments did not differ significantly from any of 
the other tasks, and the synonym judgment class differed sig- 
nificantly only from tasks involving desirability judgments. 
Only three studies in the entire sample tested children as 
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Table 1 
Summary of Study Characteristics for SRE Studies and Within Manipulation Class 
All SR-semantic SR-OR 
Variables and class (k = 129) (k = 60) (k = 69) 
Publication characteristics 
Median publication year of studies 1985 1985 
Publication form of studies 
Journal articles or book chapters 126 58 
Unpublished reports (including theses, etc.) 3 2 
1985 
68 
1 
Participant and study method characteristics 
M number of participants 38.75 47.17 31.43 
Participant population 
College undergraduate 106 54 52 
Other 23 6 17 
Age of participants 
Adult 126 57 69 
Child 3 3 0 
Geographic area of study 
United States 85 36 49 
Canada 38 22 16 
Europe 6 2 4 
Method used to test participants 
Individual 97 46 51 
Group 31 13 18 
Other a 1 1 0 
Experimental design 
Within subjects 97 32 65 
Between subjects 32 28 4 
M memory load (in words) 53.64 46.25 60.09 
Stimulus type used in included studies 
Trait words 90 47 43 
Nouns 37 11 26 
Other 2 2 0 
Relatedness of stimulus items 
High 13 9 4 
Low 116 51 65 
M number of encoding tasks presented 3.53 2.53 4.39 
Timing of stimulus presentation 
Fixed time (e.g., every 7 s) 51 23 28 
Variable, based on participant response 54 18 36 
Variable, determined by experimenter 16 12 4 
Other 7 6 1 
Unable to rate 1 1 0 
Mode of stimulus presentation 
Index cards 11 11 0 
Monitor 67 23 44 
Overhead projector 23 8 15 
Read by experimenter 18 10 8 
Tachistoscope 4 4 0 
Booklet (read by participant) 5 4 1 
Other 1 0 1 
Type of dependent variable used in studies 
Free recall 105 54 51 
Cued recall 2 2 0 
Recognition 22 4 18 
Time allowed for recall-recognition test 
Fixed 93 49 44 
Unlimited 36 11 25 
Distractor task 
Present 60 32 28 
Absent 69 28 41 
Participants' expectation of memory test 
Expect 17 2 15 
Do not expect 112 58 54 
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Table 1 (continued) 
All SR - semantic SR - OR 
Variables and class (k = 129) (k = 60) (k = 69) 
Effect size summary 
M weighted effect size (d÷) 0.50 0.65 0.35 
95% CI 0.45-0.54 0.58-0.71 0.29-0.42 
Homogeneity of effect sizes (Q)b 451.40"** 178.30"** 230.40*** 
n outliers removed to achieve homogeneity 34 (26%) 11 (18%) 14 (20%) 
M weighted ÷ excluding outliers 0.45 0.59 0.26 
95% CI 0.39-0.50 0.52-0.66 0.19-0.33 
M unweighted  0.53 0.72 0.35 
95% CI 0.42-0.62 0.58-0.86 0.22-0.45 
Note. For the purposes of these analyses, each effect size represents a separate study. CI = confidence 
interval; OR = other reference; SR = self-reference; SRE = self-reference effect. 
a Davis (1979) manipulated this variable, b Significant value indicates rejection of hypothesis of homogeneity. 
.*** p < .001. 
participants, and all three of these studies also used SR versus 
semantic tasks. However, model tests reveal that studies with 
adults as participants obtained significantly larger mean SREs 
than studies with children as participants; in both classes, the 
mean SRE was significant. In addition, whereas effect sizes in 
the children class were homogeneous, effect sizes in the adult 
class were quite heterogeneous. 
Exploratory analyses. Exploratory analyses reveal, first, that 
type of SR task related significantly to the magnitude of the 
SRE. 1 Specifically, self-descriptiveness, autobiographical, and 
other tasks do not differ in promoting recall. However, the mean 
effect size for the association with nouns class differs signifi- 
cantly from the other tasks (see Table 5). 
As Table 5 shows next, a significant model test examining 
the SRE as a function of dependent variable used shows that 
the mean SRE for studies using recognition was not significant 
but that the mean SREs for studies using free and cued recall 
were significant. Study findings were quite inconsistent within 
the free recall class but consistent in the other two classes. 
Two other model tests were significant. First, the model for 
mode of stimulus presentation shows that the use of projectors 
resulted in the largest SREs for this class, but mean effect sizes 
were not significantly different from studies that used index 
cards or booklets to present stimuli. Second, the model for par- 
ticipant population reveals that studies that tested undergradu- 
ates as participants obtained significantly larger SREs than stud- 
ies that tested participants who were not undergraduates, 
In contrast o the usual expectation that within-subjects de- 
signs are more powerful statistically than between-subjects de- 
signs, type of experimental design did not affect the magnitude 
of the SRE. F inal ly- -as Table 4 detai ls- -as the memory load 
induced in the studies increased, so did the magnitude of the 
semantic-SR effect sizes (a pattern that did not appear in the 
SR-OR class). 
Moderators of SR-OR Effect Size Magnitude 
Theoretical moderators. As Table 6 shows, within the SR-  
OR class and, consistent with expectations, the mean SRE was 
larger (and significant) in studies using traits rather than nouns. 
Moreover, the mean SRE for studies using nouns was not sig- 
nificant. (This pattern contrasts with the SR-semantic manipu- 
lation class in which results reveal significant mean SREs in 
both the traits and nouns classes.) However, both classes' effect 
sizes were quite heterogeneous. 
Also as expected, model tests reveal that familiarity of the 
rated target other did not predict the magnitude of the SRE, 
whereas intimacy did. Specifically, as Table 6 shows, studies 
in which participants rated highly intimate targets obtained a 
significantly smaller mean SRE than studies in which target 
others were low in intimacy. 2 However, although the SRE was 
smaller when highly intimate others were rated, SR still tended 
to result in better memory. 
Model tests also show that studies using self-descriptiveness 
tasks produced a significantly larger mean SRE than did studies 
using imagery tasks, as hypothesized and compared with other 
tasks (see Table 6). In addition, use of SR-imagery tasks within 
the SR- versus OR-manipulation class did not result in a signifi- 
cant mean SRE, as evidenced by the CI for that class. Within 
all three classes of SR tasks, study effects were inconsistent. 
Exploratory moderators. Exploratory model tests for OR 
task used reveal that studies in the descriptiveness class had a 
significantly larger mean SRE than did the imagery, nonspecific- 
other, and other classes. Moreover, the mean SRE for studies 
using imagery tasks was not significant, as its CI shows. Model 
tests of dependent variable used reveals a significantly larger 
SRE when recognition versus free recall was used. This pattern 
is exactly opposite from that obtained for studies in the SR 
versus semantic manipulation class, which obtained a larger 
mean SRE when recall was used rather than recognition (see 
Table 5). 
(text continues on page 384) 
l In this case, type of SR task was considered to be exploratory 
because we felt that we could not make a priori predictions about the 
patterns in the literature. This is in contrast o the same model test for 
the SR-OR manipulation class; the literature predicts that imagery task 
studies should obtain smaller SREs than other kinds of tasks. 
2 For both the familiarity and intimacy classes, studies in the unable 
to rate class tended to use nonspecific target others. It was difficult to 
classify these targets as either high or low in familiarity or intimacy. 
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Table 3 
Cross-Literature Models for SRE Magnitude 
Variable and class 
95% CI 
Between- Mean weighted for d÷ Within-class 
class effect effect size homogeneity 
(QB) k (d+) Lower Upper (Qwi) a 
Manipulation class 
SR vs. semantic 
SR vs. OR 
Type of processing induced 
by comparison task 
Relational 
Item specific 
Both relational and 
item specific 
42.70*** 
21.29"** 
60 0.65 0.58 0.71 178.30"** 
69 0.35 0.29 0.42 230.40*** 
37 0.51~ 0.43 0.59 115.68"** 
67 0.56a 0.50 0.62 282.92*** 
25 0.2% 0.19 0.39 31.50 
Note. Mean effect sizes not sharing the same subscript significantly differed (p < .05, a priori). CI = 
confidence interval; OR = other eference; SR = self-reference; SRE = self-reference effect. 
a Significance indicates rejection of the hypothesis of homogeneity. 
*** p < .001. 
Several models emerge that implicate task restrictions used 
in SRE studies that mediate the SRE. It is interesting that these 
restrictions were not found to affect the magnitude of SREs in 
the SR-semantic manipulation class. First, results show that 
the magnitude of the SRE was related to the use of distractor 
tasks. Specifically, within both the distractor-present and the 
distractor-absent classes, significant mean SREs resulted. How- 
ever, the mean SRE for the distractor-present class was signifi- 
cantly larger than the mean SRE for the distractor-absent class. 
Further analyses reveal that distractor tasks had no influence on 
the magnitude of the SRE for studies that used high-intimacy 
targets (but did for low-intimacy targets). Second, results show 
that for studies in which participants did not expect a memory 
test, there was a significantly larger mean SRE than for studies 
in which participants did expect a test. Moreover, the mean 
SRE for studies in which participants expected a test was not 
significant. Further analyses reveal that an expectation of a test 
had no effect on the magnitude of the SRE for studies that used 
high-intimacy targets (but it did for low-intimacy targets). 
Finally, two other exploratory models were significant for 
this manipulation class. The model test for mode of stimulus 
presentation shows that when researchers used a projector to 
present stimulus materials, they obtained a significantly smaller 
mean SRE than those who used monitors or presented stimuli 
orally. Moreover, studies in the projector class obtained a non- 
significant mean SRE. In each case, study findings were 
heterogeneous. 
The model test for participant population reveals that studies 
that tested undergraduates a  participants obtained a smaller 
mean SRE than studies that tested other populations. (Note that 
this pattern is opposite of that found for SR-semantic studies.) 
However, both mean SREs were significant; in both cases, study 
findings are inconsistent. 
Discuss ion 
The SRE has been of interest o researchers because of the 
assumption that it could tell them something about the self in 
memory and its relationship to other kinds of encoding pro- 
cesses. Most of the researchers cited in the literature have at- 
tempted to investigate this relationship through manipulation of 
various task parameters or with various populations. Judging by 
Table 4 
Continuous Models for Study Effect Sizes Across the Literature and Within 
Manipulation Class 
All SR - semantic SR-OR 
(k = 129) (k = 60) (k = 69) 
Predictor b /3 b /3 b /3 
Memory load -.0004 -.03 .0041" .25 -.0009 -.07 
Time between encoding and 
memory task .0160"** .16 .0135" .16 .0240** .21 
Length of stimulus presentation -.0667*** -.64 -.1060"** -.60 -.0545*** -.66 
Note. Models are least-square regressions with weights equivalent to the reciprocal of the variance of 
each effect size. k was smaller for some models. OR = other reference; SR = self-reference. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p <.001. 
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Table 5 
Effect Sizes as a Function of Task for SR-Semantic Manipulation 
Variable and class 
Between- Mean weighted 
class effect effect size 
(QB) k (d,) 
95% CI for d÷ 
Lower Upper 
Within-class 
homogeneity 
(Qwi) ~ 
Relatedness of stimuli 17.33"** 
High 9 0.20 -0.01 0.42 11.55 
Low 51 0.69 0.62 0.75 149.41"** 
Stimulus type 12.79"* 
Traits 47 0.67, 0.60 0.73 119.72"** 
Nouns 11 0.40b 0.21 0.59 42.79*** 
Other 2 1.68c 0.86 2.51 3.00 
Type of semantic task 44.54*** 
Synonym judgment 16 0.72~d 0.63 0.82 39.16"* 
Generate definition 9 1.04cd 0.84 1.24 37.74*** 
Fits sentence 4 0.32ab 0.01 0.63 0.97 
Fits category 7 0.45ab¢ 0.19 0.72 22.31"* 
Meaningful 12 0.62,~ 0.49 0.75 15.15 
Familiar 3 0.57~ 0.28 0.86 3.96 
Desirable 5 0.16, -0.06 0.37 11.86" 
Other 4 0.81,~ 0.58 1.19 2.61 
Age of participants 13.41"** 
Adult 57 0.69 0.62 0.76 164.30"** 
Child 3 0.34 0.17 0.52 0.58 
Type of SR task 9.09* 
Self-descriptiveness 42 0.66a 0.59 0.72 13.81"** 
Autobiographical 11 0.74~ 0.54 0.94 52.28*** 
Association with nouns 4 0.14b -0.22 0.49 1.00 
Other 3 0.61, 0.28 0.94 2.12 
Dependent variable 16.79"** 
Free recall 54 0.69, 0.62 0.75 151.78"** 
Cued recall 2 0.60ab 0.02 1.18 1.30 
Recognition 4 0.21b 0.00 0.43 8.42 
Mode of stimulus presentation 34.92*** 
Index cards 11 0.73~ 0.56 0.90 43.81"** 
Monitor 23 0.57~ 0.47 0.67 76.10"** 
Projector 8 1.05, 0.86 1.24 12.92 
Read by experimenter 10 0.55t~ 0.41 0.68 7.63 
Tachistoscope 4 0.43b 0.25 0.61 2.19 
Booklet 4 0.98~c 0.74 1.22 0.74 
Participant population 11.16"* 
Undergraduates 54 0.69 0.62 0.76 159.79"** 
Other 6 0.39 0.23 0.55 7.34 
Experimental design 3.08 
Within subjects 32 0.68 0.61 0.76 60.66** 
Between subjects 28 0.57 0.46 0.67 114.56"** 
Note. Mean effect sizes sharing the same subscript 
interval; SR = Self-reference. 
a Significance indicates rejection of the hypothesis of 
*p < .05. **p <.01. ***p < .001. 
do not differ 
homogeneity. 
(p > .05, post hoc). CI = confidence 
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the relatively small number of new SRE studies in the last few 
years, we could easily conclude that the field has reached an 
impasse in terms of explaining why the SRE occurs. There is, 
of course, more recent work (e.g., Klein & Loftus, 1993; Klein, 
Loftus, & Burton, 1989) that focuses specifically on the poten- 
tial causal cognitive mechanisms that underlie the SRE. This 
review represents an important empirical contribution to the 
SRE literature because, in addition to answering questions about 
the robustness of the SRE, it (a) clarifies the roles of most of 
the important moderators of the effect and suggests ome more 
that ought to be investigated, (b) confirms most of the theoreti- 
cal expectations that the SRE results because of elaborative and 
organized processing, and (c) suggests ome important avenues 
that should be investigated that have not yet been explored in 
primary-level research. 
We approach our discussion from the theoretical perspective 
that many of our findings may be explained by two aspects of 
processing tasks that may play important roles in determining 
the magnitude of the SRE: (a) the degree to which the task 
promotes organization and elaboration and (b) the nature of the 
referenced memory domain and the particular type of informa- 
tion being processed and how they may interact with these 
processes. We begin by reviewing our general findings of an 
overall SRE and the results of the models for the comparison 
class and nature of processing induced by the task. Then, we 
discuss pragmatic oncerns for the design of SRE studies, re- 
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Table 6 
Effect Sizes as a Function of Task for SR-OR Manipulation 
Variable and class 
Between- Mean weighted 95% CI for d÷ Homogeneity 
class effect effect size within each class 
(QB) k (d÷) Lower Upper (Qwi) a 
Stimulus type 57.81 *** 
Trait 43 0.53 0.45 0.60 75.95** 
Noun 26 0.03 -0.08 0.13 96.64*** 
Familiarity of rated other 0.69 
High 61 0.36a 0.30 0.43 225.89*** 
LOW 4 0.24~ -0.04 0.53 1.38 
Unable to rate 4 0.34a 0.16 0.51 2.44 
Intimacy of rated other 7.57* 
High 17 0.20a 0.07 0.33 18.26 
Low 48 0.41~ 0.34 0.49 202.12"** 
Unable to rate 4 0.34ac 0.16 0.51 2.44 
Type of SR task b 54.46*** 
Self-descriptiveness 39 0.53a 0.45 0.61 72.78** 
Imagery 13 --0.01b --0.16 0.13 27.96*** 
Other 15 0.12b -0.02 0.26 75.00*** 
Type of other task b 57.17"** 
Descriptiveness 35 0.58a 0.49 0.67 64.23** 
Imagery 13 -0.01b -0.16 0.13 27.96** 
Nonspecific other 14 0.19b 0.07 0.32 22.87 
Other 5 0.25b 0.02 0.47 57.95*** 
Dependent variable 10.54"* 
Free recall 51 0.28 0.21 0.36 149.35"** 
Recognition 18 0.50 0.39 0.61 70.51"** 
Distractor task 15.69"* 
Present 28 0.48 0.39 0.56 75.66*** 
Absent 41 0.23 0.14 0.32 139.05"** 
Expectation of test 19.72"** 
Expect 15 0.02 -0.14 0.18 46.90*** 
Do not expect 54 0.41 0.35 0.48 163.77"** 
Mode of stimulus 
presentation c 26.96*** 
Monitor 44 0.42~ 0.34 0.50 129.58"** 
Projector 15 -0.02b -0.18 0.14 37.82*** 
Read (by experimenter) 8 0.64a 0.44 0.84 18.08" 
Participant population 10.07"* 
Undergraduates 52 0.29 0.22 0.36 156.89"** 
Other 17 0.51 0.40 0.62 63.44*** 
Experimental design 1.25 
Within subjects 65 0.35 0.29 0.41 226.45*** 
Between subjects 4 0.61 0.16 1.06 2.70 
Note. Mean effect sizes sharing the same subscript do not differ (p > .05, post hoc). CI = confidence 
interval; OR = other reference; SR = self-reference. 
Significance indicates rejection of the hypothesis of homogeneity, b One study, Bower and Gilligan (1979, 
Experiment 2), included two SR versus OR comparisons that were omitted from this model test because 
they involved the only autobiographical-biographical tasks in the SR-OR manipulation class, c Two 
studies (Brown et al., 1986, Experiment 3; Wells et al., 1984) were omitted from this model test because 
they did not fit any coding class. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
gardless of manipulation class. Finally, we draw conclusions 
based on significant model tests that are unique to each particu- 
lar manipulation class. 
SRE in Memory Is Robust 
One important finding of our study is that the SRE does occur 
with highly significant regularity. Although study findings are 
inconsistent, SR was superior to semantic and OR encoding in 
facilitating memory in the studies reviewed. It may seem to 
some readers that this is a foregone conclusion of any review 
of the SRE, but there is some disagreement among researchers 
in this literature as to whether SR tends to promote memory 
better overall than other kinds of processes. For example, as we 
noted earlier, Higgins and Bargh's (1987) important narrative 
review concludes that "self-reference is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for memory of input to be facil itated" (p. 392). Our 
meta-analytic review suggests that, in fact, SR- -a l though not 
necessary to promote good reca l l - - i s  sufficient, by virtue of its 
ability to promote both item-specific and relational processing as 
well as its ability to promote compatible ncoding and retrieval 
conditions. 
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Effects of Manipulation Class and the Nature of 
Processing 
Manipulation class. The first moderator that affected the 
magnitude of the SRE across the literature was that a larger 
mean SRE was obtained in SR-semantic studies than in SR- 
OR studies. First, note that the SRE occurs on the average 
within both manipulation classes, although study findings were 
inconsistent. This finding begins to suggest possible differences 
between person-reference versus semantic processing as tasks, 
a topic that we discuss below. 
Within the class of studies that used SR-OR manipulations, 
given the debates that have occurred in the literature, the finding 
that SR tends to promote better memory than OR may be surpris- 
ing (cf. Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Brown et al., 1986; Lord, 
1980, 1987; Maki & McCaul, 1985). Those debates arose be- 
cause of inconsistent s udy findings; for example, reference to 
familiar others apparently causes the SRE to "disappear," lead- 
ing researchers to argue that SR creates no memory advantage 
over reference to a familiar other. The results of our study show 
that, although the SRE was weaker in SR-OR studies, it was 
nevertheless present and statistically significant, as predicted. 
The finding that he SRE was larger for SR-semantic manipu- 
lations is also intriguing if one begins to consider the nature of 
the underlying memory processes and structures. If, for example, 
it is assumed that both self and semantic representations (or 
processing, for that matter) are qualitatively similar, then one 
must also be able to explain why SR tends to facilitate memory 
better than semantic encoding overall. None of the models that 
we analyzed could completely explain the variation in the SR- 
semantic cases. Although we must be careful about conclusions 
with regard to the structures that underlie SR and semantic 
processing that are based on correlational evidence, one plausi- 
ble conclusion is that SR is more effective in producing ood 
recall than is a semantic task for a number of reasons. Specifi- 
cally, the typical SR task (a) uses traits as stimulus items more 
than 80% of the time, (b) taps trait domains likely to have been 
elaborated on many times using SR, (c) is likely to promote an 
SR mode in retrieval because of this practiced elaboration of 
traits, and (d) taps trait domains that are, because of the two 
points just mentioned (b and c), likely to be highly organized 
along self-related (or at least person-referent) dimensions. Con- 
sistent with this reasoning, SR promotes better ecall than se- 
mantic processing across the literature; but, perhaps more im- 
portant, when we examined only SRE studies that used SR and 
semantic tasks that promote both relational and item-specific 
processing, the SRE was much smaller than it was for the set 
of all SR-semantic cases, k = 7, d = 0.29, 95% CI = 0.09- 
0.49. However, even in this subclass of studies, there was sig- 
nificant heterogeneity, Qwi(6) = 22.41, p < .01; thus, although 
our codings of relational and item-specific processing predict 
some of the variation in SR-semantic studies, it does not ac- 
count for all of the variation (cf. Klein & Loftus, 1988). As 
we discuss later, some models we examined within the SR- 
semantic lass help to shed light on important moderators of 
the relationship, however, because in almost every case study 
findings were inconsistent, primary-level research is still needed 
to isolate the causal mechanisms responsible for the difference 
between SR and semantic encoding. 
Model test for nature of processing induced. The second 
important model test shows that the degree to which compared 
encoding tasks are equivalent in promoting item-specific and 
relational processing affects the magnitude ofthe SRE. As stated 
earlier, for each study in the literature, the comparison tasks 
were judged to promote ither elational processing, item-spe- 
cific processing, orboth (e.g., "Does the word mean the same as 
xxx?" probably promotes elaborative processing predominantly, 
whereas "Does the word describe your mother?" likely pro- 
motes both kinds of processes). Results show significantly 
smaller SREs on average for tasks that involved both kinds of 
processing. This would be expected if SR and the comparison 
task both promote the same kinds of processing. In addition, 
the effect sizes for this class were consistent, hus no further 
model testing is needed to explain that variation. Nonetheless, 
it is important to note that, even when the comparison task 
involved both kinds of processes, there was still a significant 
SRE for that class of studies. Presumably, SR not only invokes 
both processes but possibly more relational and item-specific 
processing. Of course, other alternatives are possible: For exam- 
ple, some additional process or condition may be invoked that 
results in superior memory, such as encoding specificity, or, 
because the majority of studies in this class used trait adjectives, 
it may be that SR poses an advantage because of the sheer 
frequency with which the average person relates traits to himself 
or herself (Wells et al., 1984). 
Also interesting, and not wholly unexpected, is the finding that 
there was no difference in the magnitude of the SRE for studies 
in which the comparison task involved either elational or item- 
specific processing. In both cases, SR was superior in producing 
memory because theoretically SR invokes both. In both classes, 
however, there was significant variation in effect sizes. 'However, 
based on our data, the process of controlling for organization or
elaboration does not entirely eliminate the SRE. 
Roles of Organization and Elaboration 
Understanding the role of organization can help us to explain 
the difference between semantic processing and SR if we take 
some of the following points into account. We have identified 
studies in which the comparison task has the potential to invoke 
relational (vs. item-specific) processing; however, just because 
a task promotes relational processing does not mean that mem- 
ory will necessarily be facilitated. For example, the provision 
of cues to help recall a category may facilitate memory for the 
category but not necessarily items in the category (Tulving & 
Pearlstone, 1966). In addition to the possibility that organiza- 
tion will not facilitate memory in all circumstances, we note 
too that, except for a few instances in the SRE literature, organi- 
zational instructions to the participant are rarely used in the 
design of studies (for notable exceptions, ee Klein & Kihl- 
strom, 1986; and Klein & Loftus, 1988). Nonetheless, Klein 
and his colleagues have produced evidence that some SR tasks 
naturally promote such organization and that such organization 
does facilitate memory. Other evidence suggests that people will 
use categorization in the absence of category labels (e.g., Lewis, 
1971), and that category size is an important task parameter. 
For example, Hunt and Seta (1984) showed that large categories 
were more likely to promote relational processing. However, 
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they also showed that, because relational processing is naturally 
promoted already, an encoding task that promotes item-specific 
processing is more beneficial for recall. Thus, relational pro- 
cessing is more likely to help recall of small categories than 
large ones. 
These points may help to explain why SR promotes recall 
better than semantic encoding. On the one hand, SR has the 
potential (a) to provide self-relevant category labels, which may 
be helpful to facilitate subsequent recall because itmay facilitate 
the reinstatement of encoding conditions at retrieval; (b) to help 
with the efficient processing of trait adjectives, despite the size 
of such a category, because of frequent processing of that do- 
main; as well as (c) because it arguably promotes item-specific 
as well as relational processing, thus complementing the rela- 
tional processing that is already present to create optimal recall 
conditions. On the other hand, without specific attention drawn 
to categories, the typical semantic-processing task is at a dis- 
advantage on several counts because (a) for most people, pro- 
cessing trait adjectives (a large category) semantically is not a 
frequent or well-practiced task; consequently, (b) category la- 
bels may not be as readily available; moreover, (c) although the 
nature of most semantic tasks in the literature is to promote 
item-specific versus relational processing, to the extent hat SR 
promotes both, it is the more versatile of the two tasks. 
One notable xception to this conclusion concerns the desir- 
ability task. We believe that the pattern we found in our meta- 
analysis lends support o the idea that, although pleasantness- 
desirability ratings have been traditionally used in the cognitive 
literature as a task thought to promote laboration (e.g., Hunt & 
Einstein, 1981), in the typical SRE paradigm task, it is likely 
to promote a certain degree of relational processing as well 
(Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986). It fits the criteria for relational 
processing in that (a) there is potential for recognition of a 
category label and (b) such processing draws attention to the 
fact that, in the stimulus list words, there are words that are 
related in the sense that they are either desirable or not. This 
assumption, of course, represents an empirical question that 
could be addressed in further investigations. 
Along this same line of reasoning, person reference may gen- 
erally promote more memory than a semantic task when list 
words are adjectives. It is logical to assume that some of the 
same mechanisms that govern an SR task may operate in any 
person-reference task. A person-reference task probably pro- 
vides a potential for recognition of an obvious category label, 
a task that is frequently practiced, and the potential for the 
development of an organized omain in memory around that 
person because the task is frequently practiced. As an application 
of this logic, the difference between SR and other person refer- 
ence is, of course, one of degrees. In other words, information 
about certain specific people (your mother, best friend, or worst 
enemy) is more frequently processed than information about 
other people (Johnny Carson or the experimenter at your study). 
People who are more often part of the information-processing 
environment are likely to be more accessible. Certainly, apartic- 
ipant who has engaged in an encoding task involving questions 
about himself or herself and about another person still has that 
information accessible in memory when asked to retrieve it. 
However, the more well known the person referenced is, the 
more organized and elaborated the information about he person 
in memory is and the more accessible the person category is. 
One important consequence of this idea is the potential for 
reinstatement of conditions at retrieval that are compatible with 
those that were present when the information was encoded. 
Thus, SR should pose an advantage in processing over other 
tasks, as our findings uggest. 
Pragmatic Concerns for the Design of SRE Studies 
Certain task variations used in SRE studies appear to affect 
the size of the SRE. These moderating variables uggest practi- 
cal concerns that should be confronted by researchers when they 
design studies to investigate the SRE. It is interesting that, in 
some cases, moderators that have a significant effect on the 
magnitude of the SRE have apparently been ignored as factors 
in SRE study designs. The first of these moderators i memory 
load. Our results how that, as memory load increases, the mag- 
nitude of the SRE also increases but that this pattern exists only 
for SR-semantic comparisons. This model implies that, when 
there is a great deal to remember, SR is a relatively efficient 
processing strategy when compared with semantic encoding. 
One practical implication of this finding is that memory load 
may be an important consideration for researchers who wish to 
maximize (or minimize) the advantage of SR in their studies. 
From a theoretical standpoint, this finding is a bit puzzling. 
Earlier, we discussed the effects of category size (Hunt & Seta, 
1984): Large categories automatically promote relational pro- 
cessing, thus an item-specific processing task should facilitate 
memory more than a relational-processing task. Because most 
semantic tasks involve item-specific processing, why would the 
SRE increase as the memory load increases? To answer the 
question, we looked at the types of stimulus items that were 
processed. When traits are used as stimulus items, the SRE does 
increase as memory load increases, k = 47,/3 = .26, p < .01, 
demonstrating an advantage for person reference when pro- 
cessing trait items, a finding that is in-line theoretically with the 
patterns we predicted earlier. However, when the stimulus items 
are nouns, the pattern reverses itself, k = 11, /3 = -.47, p < 
.01. In this case, as memory load increases, the SRE gets 
smaller; this is a case where semantic processing is the normal 
processing mode for these kind of stimuli, thus posing an advan- 
tage because nouns are often elaborated and organized throtigh 
semantic processing. 
It is interesting that the choice of experimental design had no 
impact on the magnitude of the SRE. Our data show that the 
choice of a within- or between-subjects de ign made no differ- 
ence for studies across the literature (or in either manipulation 
class). This is a curious finding because one would expect hat 
controlling individual differences in processing would make a 
marked ifference in the kinds of processes investigated in our 
meta-analysis. Thus, the SRE should have been larger in both 
manipulation classes when researchers used within- versus be- 
tween-subjects designs. We speculate that interference may oc- 
cur between encoding conditions in a within-subjects design. 
For example, Aron et al. (1991) have suggested that intimate 
others may actually overlap the self. Consequently, there is a 
confounding that arises that may render SR less advantageous 
than it is when a less intimate other is referenced. Similarly, 
participants may sometimes spontaneously consider whether a
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word in a semantic condition describes themselves. This kind of 
interference should occur less frequently in a between-subjects 
design, thus the SRE could be larger. The question is an empiri- 
cal one, however, because virtually all studies in the literature 
that involved intimate other targets used within-subjects designs. 
Finally, two moderators--participant opulation and mode of 
presentation--were found to exert opposite ffects for the two 
manipulation classes. For the SR-OR class, larger SREs were 
found when undergraduate students were not the participants; in
the SR-semantic lass, when undergraduates were the partici- 
pants, significantly larger SREs were obtained than for other 
populations. This is a difficult finding to explain, and one that 
has received little attention because it has not been considered 
important theoretically (except to the degree that, e.g., the popula- 
tion possessed some characteristic hat affects SR, such as depres- 
sion; Kuiper & Rogers, 1979). An examination f the 17 nonun- 
dergraduate studies hows that the samples were from a variety 
of other populations (e.g., participants with depression, healthy 
adults recruited from local communities, etc.). We present the 
results of this model as a design consideration that may be of 
importance tosome researchers who choose to test other popula- 
tions, whether out of convenience or necessity. 
The second moderator, mode of presentation, is similarly in- 
triguing in that it results in opposite patterns for the two manipu- 
lation classes. Specifically, in the SR-OR class, SREs were not 
obtained on average when a projector was used (monitors or 
orally presented stimuli resulted in significantly arger SREs). 
In contrast, projectors resulted in the largest SREs for the SR- 
semantic lass. Different modes of presentation have largely 
been taken for granted in SRE study designs; presumably, the 
choice has been made based on convenience and history. The 
differences that we found may point to subtle differences in 
processing that may occur as a consequence of the choice of 
presentation mode. In particular, it should be noted that, in many 
cases in which projectors are used, the choice is often made, 
because the experimenter wishes to test more than one partici- 
pant at a time. It may be that, when an SR-OR manipulation 
is used, the presence of other people may provide cues for 
participant s (even though fellow participants are not the refer- 
enced target) that may help to facilitate subsequent retrieval. 
Although admittedly speculative, it is an interesting question 
that merits consideration i  future primary research. 
Variation Within the Two Manipulation Classes 
At this point, we turn to a number of task parameters in 
SRE studies that explain variation within the two manipulation 
classes (SR-OR and SR-semantic). Several of these model 
tests suggest pragmatic issues in the design of SRE studies 
that researchers may have overlooked that directly affect the 
magnitude of the SRE; others have theoretical significance and 
may suggest new avenues of exploration. We begin with the set 
of moderators, unique to a particular manipulation class, that 
suggest either important task parameters that significantly affect 
the magnitude of the SRE or important theoretical variables. 
Models for the SR-OR class. Three model tests that pertain 
only to the SR-OR class were significant: (a) intimacy of the 
target other, (b) type of SR task, and (c) type of OR task. The 
results of the first model test show that, although studies that 
used highly intimate target others did obtain a significant mean 
SRE, this effect was significantly smaller than that obtained for 
studies that used low-intimacy target others. It should be noted 
that familiarity of the target other had no effect on the magnitude 
of observed SREs for studies in this class? We specifically 
included ratings of both familiarity and intimacy in the meta- 
analysis because itwas obvious that researchers did not discrim- 
inate between these variables. For example, Johnny Carson may 
be referred to as a highly familiar target in some studies, but 
he is not likely to be a highly intimate target o the average 
participant. Thus, it does not come as a complete surprise that 
familiarity does not result in a significant model test when both 
one's mother and Carson are classified as highly familiar targets. 
Our hypothesis that intimacy is a significant predictor of the 
magnitude of the SRE was supported. Results how a weak, but 
still significant, SRE for studies in the high-intimacy lass, and 
study findings are homogeneous. Even though the referenced 
target is highly intimate, there is still a slight advantage of SR. 
Moreover, there is a significant difference between the class of 
studies that used highly intimate targets and low-intimacy tar- 
gets, with significantly larger SREs in the low-intimacy class. 
Thus, reference to highly intimate others promotes memory al- 
most as well as SR. 
Thus, consistent with our hypotheses and contentions in the 
literature, results suggest hat referencing a very well-known 
other, information about whom is presumably well organized 
and elaborated on in memory, has a facilitating effect on recall. 
Because the self is, presumably, even better known and informa- 
tion about he self has been even more frequently elaborated on 
and organized, SR facilitates memory even better. As Aron et 
al. (1991) have suggested, to the degree that a relationship s
intimate, it is also likely to overlap with one's self-representa- 
tions. Memory representations of one's mother are very likely 
to be fraught with SR associations, for example. It is possible 
that autobiographical retrieval may be more sensitive to this 
possibility than are trait descriptiveness tasks. However, only 
two studies in the literature used an episodic retrieval task in 
the SR-OR class .(Bower & Gilligan, 1979), and both used 
high-intimacy targets, thus no comparison totest his possibility 
was possible. Future research should address this possibility. 
Type of task was shown to be a significant moderator f SRE 
size in the SR-OR class. Results show that studies that used 
imagery tasks did not observe SREs on average, confirming 
Lord's (1980) hypothesis that the SRE will not occur with 
imagery instructions. Moreover, whereas tudies that used imag- 
ery tended not to obtain SREs, all other types of tasks (SR or 
OR) in the SR-OR class did tend to produce SREs. Model tests 
for both type of SR task and type of OR task reveal that studies 
that used descriptiveness ta ks found significantly arger SREs, 
on average, than any other type of task. Lord offered an explana- 
tion for this finding: He theorized that imagery involves the 
same kind of visual processing a person uses when he or she 
3 We performed continuous model tests as well for both familiarity 
and intimacy. The continuous models were based on ratings made by 
undergraduates who had judged the intimacy and familiarity of each 
referenced target used in the SRE literature. The findings for the continu- 
ous models parallel the categorical models we presented based on our 
codings. We thus omitted them to avoid redundancy. 
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actually views an object. When imagining others, he argued, one 
assumes one's usual visual orientation. In contrast, SR imagery 
forces participants o imagine themselves, causing them to as- 
sume an unusual visual orientation. Because imagining oneself 
is not a customary visual perspective, it does not help to facilitate 
memory. Imagining others, however, is customary; thus imagin- 
ing others facilitates memory as well as SR imagery. Our results 
provide no evidence to contradict Lord' s explanation. We would 
note, however, that Lord's formulation suggests that the imagin- 
ing of others should promote recall superior to that of SR. This 
hypothesis was not supported by our data: Results of the meta- 
analysis do not show that the imagining of others facilitates 
memory better than does SR. 
Models for the SR-semantic lass. Three model tests 
unique to the SR-semantic class were significant: (a) age, (b) 
type of SR task, and (c) type of semantic task. Results from 
the model test for age show that the SRE was significantly arger 
for studies that tested adults than for those that tested children. 
This finding is consistent with the hypotheses of the researchers 
who investigated age differences (e.g., Halpin, Puff, Mason, & 
Marston, 1984; Pullyblank et al., 1985). It has been argued that 
a likely explanation for this difference is that it is related to the 
rate of development of the self-concept. Specifically, children 
may exhibit a smaller advantage of SR relative to semantic 
encoding because their self-concepts are in an earlier develop- 
mental stage than adults. Consequently, the self-concept either 
has not developed sufficiently to facilitate processing to the 
degree that the adult self-concept can or has not been sufficiently 
elaborated toprovide a ready network of potential retrieval cues 
to facilitate recall. 
We offer a different explanation: An examination f the tasks 
used in studies that compare SR in children with SR in adults 
suggests that, although task adaptations were made for younger 
participants, the tasks were still very similar to those presented 
to adults. Thus, our alternative explanation is that researchers 
may not have observed SREs because task demands were inap- 
propriate to participants' developmental stage, not because chil- 
dren lack sufficiently developed self-concepts toproduce SREs. 
Some data are available to support his contention. Barnas and 
Symons (1995) compared preschool children (4-5 years old) 
with older children (in kindergarten a d first grade). The encod- 
ing task was modified such that pictorial stimuli were presented 
with each corresponding stimulus word at encoding. Children 
were then given a standard free-recall memory test. Results how 
that not only do very young children demonstrate an SRE but 
also there was no interaction between encoding task and age. 
Thus, we suggest hat conclusions about the relationship be- 
tween self-concept development and the SRE may be premature. 
More research is needed to address this issue. 
The model for type of SR task shows that there was a signifi- 
cant difference between studies that used either self-descriptive- 
ness tasks or autobiographical retrieval tasks and those that 
used tasks involving association of the self with nouns (e.g., 
professions: "Did you ever wish to be a 9; doctor"). 
Studies that used tasks involving noun associations consistently 
did not observe SREs--a finding that may well be due to the 
use of nouns as stimuli, an issue that we discuss at some length 
below. More interesting is the finding that there is no difference 
between self-descriptiveness ta ks and autobiographical re- 
trieval tasks in terms of the magnitude of the SRE they produce. 
Klein and his colleagues (Klein & Loftus, 1993; Klein et al., 
1989) have made convincing arguments hat to engage in a self- 
descriptiveness judgment versus an autobiographical retrieval 
task may actually involve the tapping of separate memory repre- 
sentations. They showed, for example, that a person who en- 
gages in a self-descriptiveness task before engaging in an auto- 
biographical retrieval task does not shorten response latencies 
on the second task, implying that information obtained uring 
the self-descriptiveness judgment does not facilitate the autobio- 
graphical retrieval task. They showed the same pattern when 
autobiographical retrieval precedes the self-descriptiveness 
tasks. Klein et al. concluded that the two tasks tap different 
sources of information. Although their findings are compelling, 
we note that, on the basis of our meta-analysis, the differences 
that they observed o not seem to extend to dependent variables 
involving retrieval. That is, although self-descriptiveness judg- 
ments and autobiographical retrieval may involve accessing dif- 
ferent areas of memory and some researchers have argued that 
the two tasks should generate different levels of recall (Bellezza, 
1993), the magnitude of the SRE is equivalent in the two task 
classes. Thus, the two tasks appear to generate equivalent levels 
of recall. An extension of Klein and Loftus's model to other 
dependent variables may help to explain the bases of the SRE. 
Although the model for type of semantic task used compares 
several types of encoding tasks, some patterns emerge that may 
suggest important theoretical issues. The first pattern is that 
studies that used desirability ratings did not observe SREs on 
average, consistent with Ferguson et al.'s (1983) hypothesis. 
These researchers argued that the evaluative component inherent 
in SR tasks was a confounding variable and that, if SR is com- 
pared with an evaluative-judgment semantic task (i.e., judg- 
ments of the stimulus word's desirability), the SRE would 
disappear. 
Our results do confirm this pattern. However, an obvious 
alternative xplanation, given the focus of our article, is that 
the desirability task promotes both relational and item-specific 
processing, as we discussed earlier. If future research supports 
this conclusion, then it will explain why studies thai used desir- 
ability ratings obtained significantly smaller SREs than studies 
that used either synonym judgments orgenerate-definition asks, 
which primarily promote laborative processing (cf. Klein & 
Kihlstrom, 1986; Klein & Loftus, 1988). One other purely spec- 
ulative explanation may be offered for researchers not finding 
a signficant mean SRE in studies in which desirability ratings 
were used. It may be that, when participants judge the desirabil- 
ity of a trait adjective, there is a degree of SR involved, thus the 
same sort of interference that may result when one is processing 
information about an intimate other target. That is, an answer 
to the question, "Is this a desirable word?," may implicitly 
involve a judgment regarding whether "this is a desirable word 
for me" from the participant's perspective. Thus, ironically, it 
is possible that desirability and SR are confounded but not in 
the way Ferguson et al. (1983) hypothesized. Future researchers 
should specifically address the nature of the personal relevance 
of the to-be-processed words for the participant and how SR 
and desirability judgments facilitate memory. To date, very few 
researchers have done this, with the exception of researchers 
who investigated the effects of self-schematicity on the SRE 
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(e.g., Kuiper & Derry, 1982; Symons, 1990). As researchers 
continue to examine specific processing strategies that may pro- 
duce the SRE, these issues should be illuminated. 
Theoretical Differences Between Person-Reference 
and Semantic Processing 
The results of several model tests are interesting in that they 
allow us to speculate about the differences between person- 
reference and semantic processing. Our conclusions are based 
on a complex of model tests that were significant (or not sig- 
nificant) for one manipulation class versus the other. Specifi- 
cally, some model tests were significant for the SR-OR class 
but not for the SR-semantic class; some, such as stimulus type, 
show different patterns for the two classes. The results of these 
model tests allow us to theorize about differences between the 
SR-OR and SR-semantic manipulation classes and, in general 
perhaps, between person-reference and semantic encoding. 
The first important theoretical model that we tested that re- 
flects differences between person-reference p r se (SR-OR 
comparisons) and SR-semantic comparisons i  the model test 
for stimulus type. Results show that, when nouns were used as 
stimuli, there was no SRE for the SR-OR class. However, when 
traits were used as stimuli, the studies obtained a significant 
mean SRE that was significantly larger than the mean SRE 
found for nouns. In contrast, in the SR-semantic class, a sig- 
nificant mean SRE appeared when either traits or nouns were 
used as stimuli, but the SRE was significantly arger with traits 
than nouns. 
Many researchers have speculated about he ways in which 
traits are represented in memory (e.g., Breckler, Pratkanis, & 
McCann, 1991 ). It is interesting that nouns seem to be equally 
well remembered in both SR and OR (i.e., person-referent) 
conditions across studies in the SR-OR manipulation class. 
This finding may have implications for the assertion that nouns 
are sometimes part of the self-representation (e.g., Klein & 
Kihlstrom, 1986). If we make the assumption that nouns are 
not part of the self-representation andthe SRE is indeed a "self- 
based" phenomenon, then SR encoding of nouns should not be 
expected to pose an advantage for later memory (Maki & 
McCaul, 1985). However, if we hold to the assumption that 
nouns are not an integral part of the self-concept (and that, 
therefore, SR should not facilitate memory for nouns), we must 
also be able to explain why it is that we find an SRE for SR- 
semantic manipulations that used nouns as stimuli. The most 
likely and parsimonious explanation for the finding of no SRE 
when nouns are used in SR-OR studies is that, of the 26 studies 
that used nouns, 13 also used imagery tasks, which tend not to 
find SREs on average, as we discussed earlier. The rest of the 
studies used nonstandard tasks, either judgments about a non- 
specific other (for the OR task; k = 8) or tasks that were judged 
to be unusual and could not be included with other classes. 
Again, this is an important line of questioning by which pro- 
cessing assumptions about SR versus other kinds of processes 
could be tested by careful attention to the kinds of stimuli that 
are presented to participants. 
The model test for dependent variable is consistent with our 
earlier discussion of the effects of organization and elaboration. 
Results how opposite patterns for recall and recognition i the 
two manipulation classes. In both manipulation classes, there is 
a significant difference between studies that used recognition 
versus those that used free recall. In the SR-semantic lass, 
however, SREs were significantly larger for studies that used 
recall rather than those that used recognition; in fact, studies 
that used recognition tended not to observe SREs at all. In 
contrast, SR-OR studies that used recognition observed sig- 
nificantly larger SREs on average than those that used free recall. 
It seems then that the presence of retrieval cues following an 
SR-semantic manipulation provides an advantage following se- 
mantic encoding. A recognition task may provide cues that sup- 
ply an advantage equivalent to that inherent in an OR or SR 
task, which may have the benefit of a category label to facilitate 
retrieval. In contrast, the presence of retrieval cues following 
OR seems to disrupt retrieval, resulting in larger SREs than 
those obtained with free-recall tasks. It may be that experi- 
menter-imposed r trieval cues may actually interfere with sub- 
jective categorical structures imposed by the participant when 
encoding words about another person. Although this explanation 
is purely speculative, this pattern may be related to our findings 
for the next set of model tests, which indicate that OR may be 
sensitive to interference with short-term emory stores. As a 
final precaution, we note that we did not compare semantic 
encoding with OR directly; therefore, care should be observed 
with regard to comparisons of the two types of processing. 
OR Tasks: Sensitive to Disruptions in Short-Term 
Memory? 
The final set of models that we examined are specific to 
the SR-OR manipulation class and suggest hat OR may be 
particularly sensitive to task restrictions that interfere with short- 
term memory stores. First, the model for expectation of test 
shows that there was no SRE when participants expected to 
have their recall tested following the encoding task but that 
studies using incidental learning paradigms observed SREs on 
average. Second, the use of distractor tasks resulted in a larger 
mean SRE than when distractor tasks were not used in SR-OR 
studies. Because (a) the expectation of a memory test should 
increase the use of rehearsal strategies and (b) distractor tasks 
disrupt any rehearsal strategies that participants may decide to 
undertake, both of these model tests suggest hat rehearsal is 
disrupted and results in a disadvantage for retrieval following 
OR that does not affect SR-semantic comparisons. It is interest- 
ing that both of these models are consistent with Kuiper and 
Rogers's (1979) theory that OR may require some sort of re- 
hearsal strategy to be mnemonically effective. 
Two interesting continuous models suggest that OR may be 
sensitive to task restrictions that affect ime or short-term em- 
ory immediately following encoding tasks: SREs increased (a) 
as time between encoding and retrieval increased and (b) as 
length of stimulus presentation decreased. These findings ug- 
gest that, the longer the time between encoding and retrieval, 
the more likely it is that SR will promote more memory than 
OR. (These patterns also hold true for semantic encoding, al- 
though the magnitude of the effect is somewhat smaller.) For 
OR manipulations, this finding is further support for the idea 
that OR may benefit from a rehearsal strategy: The longer parti- 
cipants are required to retain the information i short-term em- 
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ory, the less likely that OR will prove as effective a mnemonic 
strategy relative to SR. 
The finding that SR has an advantage when length of stimulus 
presentation is briefer for both the SR-OR and the SR-semantic 
classes is important because it suggests the possibility that SR 
may promote good retention more quickly than either semantic 
or OR processing; both semantic and OR processing seem to 
require more processing time to be mnemonically effective. One 
interpretation of these findings is that the SRE is "time sensi- 
tive": SR may be an especially effective strategy, compared 
with OR, if participants have to wait a long time between encod- 
ing and retrieval or if they have to encode stimuli very rapidly. 
Thus, our findings suggest hat SR may be more spontaneous 
or automatic in promoting memory than OR. 
However, before special mnemonic properties are attributed 
to SR, we thought it wise to investigate the possibility that these 
effects exist also when participants refer a word to memory 
structures that may be very similar to the self in memory (Aron 
et al., 1991). When these models are tested using only highly 
intimate others, we found that the short-term emory interfer- 
ence created by either a distractor task or failure to expect a 
test, as well as the findings with regard to length of stimulus 
presentation, all fall away when highly intimate others are refer- 
enced. However, these model tests with high-intimacy others 
involved a small number of studies. These possibilities are par- 
ticularly intriguing and deserve to be investigated in primary- 
level research. 
These findings suggest patterns that have been virtually ig- 
nored in the SRE literature until our meta-analysis. Based on 
our assumption that SR is constant across both manipulation 
classes, the patterns uggest an important difference between 
OR and semantic encoding. Because, in the SR-semantic lass, 
the magnitude of the SRE is unaffected by distractor tasks or 
expectation of a test, we assume that semantic encoding is resis- 
tant to the effects of these task parameters on short-term 
memory. 
Conclus ions 
Researchers repeatedly have asked the question, "Is the self 
unique?"4 Although our study cannot directly address questions 
about the self-structure in memory, it indicates that certain as- 
pects of engaging in an SR task may indeed pose special mne- 
monic advantages. First, although SR is posited to promote both 
relational and item-specific processing, even when SR is paired 
with a task judged to also promote these processes, an SRE 
emerges. Of course, we have not made assumptions about the 
degree to which these tasks promote both kinds of processing, 
but our results suggest hat SR is more effective in promoting 
memory. Results with regard to stimulus items and length of 
stimulus presentation suggest that SR may be particularly spon- 
taneous and efficient when stimulus items are commonly judged 
through person reference (e.g., traits; Markus, 1977). Moreover, 
although SR is superior to OR in promoting memory and even 
when intimate other targets were judged, we observed that in 
many ways the referencing of an intimate other appears to have 
similar effects to SR. For example, even the short-term emory 
disruptions that we observed isappear for judgments of highly 
intimate others. 
The everyday implications of these findings extend to many 
different areas. Certainly the power of SR has been underesti- 
mated in some areas and, possibly, overestimated in others. One 
implication of our study is that SR works best to facilitate 
memory when certain kinds of stimuli are used--st imuli  that 
are commonly organized and elaborated on through SR. When 
these stimuli are used, however, SR appears to be a very efficient, 
possibly spontaneous processing mode. Of course, future re- 
searchers must address these questions with more direct compar- 
isons of SR, OR, and semantic encoding, with particular atten- 
tion to differences in the kinds of stimulus material used and 
their importance to the individual participant. More important, 
we hope that researchers will address several new potential 
causal processes uggested by our meta-analysis that may ex- 
plain why the SRE occurs. Our evidence suggests that SR is a 
uniquely efficient process; but it is probably unique only in the 
sense that, because it is a highly practiced task, it results in 
spontaneous, efficient processing of certain kinds of information 
that people deal with each day--material  that is often used, 
well organized, and exceptionally well elaborated. 
4 We recognize that there is still debate in cognitive literatures as to 
the question of the self's uniqueness (Breckler, Pratkanis, & McCann, 
1991; Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; A. G. Greenwald & Banaji, 1989; 
Higgins & Bargh, 1987). As Breckler et al. pointed out, it is premature 
to conclude that the self is a unique structure. For one thing, theoretical 
models of the self are not sufficiently specified to assert hat the self is 
a unique structure in memory (G. T. Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984). 
Moreover, the criteria for uniqueness are unclear, although such criteria 
have been pursued by researchers inother areas of memory (see Oster- 
gaard, 1992). 
References 
References marked with an asterisk indicate studies included 
in the meta-analysis. 
Anderson, J. R., & Reder, L. M. (1979). An elaborative processing ex- 
planation of depth of processing. In L. S. Cermak & E I. M. Craik 
(Eds.), Levels of processing in human memory (pp. 385-403 ). Hills- 
dale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Aron, A., Aron, E., Tudor, M., & Nelson, G. (1991). Close relationships 
as including other and self, Journal of Personality and Social Psychol- 
ogy, 60, 241-253. 
Banaji, M. R., & Prentice, D.A. (1994). The self in social contexts. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 45, 297-332. 
*Bargh, J. A., & Tota, M. E. (1988). Context-dependent au omatic pro- 
cessing in depression: Accessibility of negative constructs with regard 
to self but not others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
54, 925-939. 
Barnas, M. V., & Symons, C. S. (1995, April). Self-reference encoding 
as a memory aid in young children. Paper presented at the meeting 
of the Eastern Psychological Association, Boston, MA. 
*Baron, R. S., & Moore, D. L. (1987). The impact of exercise-induced 
arousal on the self-other effect. Social Cognition, 5, 166-177. 
Battig, W. E, & Bellezza, E S. (1979). Organization and levels of pro- 
cessing. In C. R. Puff (Ed.), Memory organization and structure (pp. 
321-346). New York: Academic Press. 
Bellezza, E S. (1984). The self as a mnemonic device: The role of 
internal cues. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 506- 
516. 
Bellezza, F. S. (1993). Does "perplexing" describe the self-reference 
MNEMONIC ADVANTAGES OF THE SELF 393 
effect? Yes! In T. K. Srull & R. S. Wyer (Eds.), Advances in social 
cognition (Vol. 5, pp. 51-59). New York: Erlbaum. 
Bellezza, E S., & Hoyt, S. K. (1992). The self-reference effect and 
mental cuing. Social Cognition, 10, 51-78. 
Bousfield, A. K., & Bousfield, W. A. (1966). Measurement of clustering 
and of sequential constancies in repeated free recall. Psychological 
Reports, 19, 935-942. 
*Bowel; G. H., & Gilligan, S. G. (1979). Remembering information related 
to one's self. Journal of Research in Personality, 13, 420-432. 
*Bradley, B., & Mathews, A. (1983). Negative self-schemata in clinical 
depression. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 22 (3), 173-181. 
*Bradley, B.P., & Mathews, A. (1988). Memory bias in recovered 
clinical depressives. Information processing and the emotional disor- 
ders [Special issue]. Cognition and Emotion, 2, 235-245. 
*Breck, B. E., & Smith, S. H. (1983). selective recall of self-descriptive 
traits by socially anxious and nonanxious females. Social Behavior 
and Personality, 11, 71-76. 
Breckler, S. J., Pratkanis, A. R., & McCann, C. D. ( 1991 ). The represen- 
tation of self in multidimensional cognitive space. British Journal of 
Social Psychology, 30, 97-112. 
*Brown, P., Keenan, J. M., & Potts, G. R. (1986). The self-reference 
effect with imagery encoding. Journal of Personality and Social Psy- 
chology, 51, 897-906. 
*Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Morris, K. J. ( 1985 ). Semantic, evalua- 
tive, and self-referent processing: Memory, cognitive ffort, and soma- 
tovisceral activity. Psychophysiology, 22, 371-384. 
Cantor, N., & Kihlstrom, J. E (1987). Personality and social intelli- 
gence. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. E (1981). Attention and self-regulation: 
A control-theory approach to human behavior. New York: Springer- 
Verlag. 
Catrambone, R., Beike, D., & Niedenthal, P. (1996). Is the self-concept 
a habitual referent in judgments of similarity? Psychological Science, 
7, 158-163. 
Catrambone, R., & Markus, H. (1987). The role of self-schemas in
going beyond the information given. Social Cognition, 5, 349-368. 
*Clifford, P. I., & Hemsley, D. R. (1987). The influence of depression 
on the processing of personal attributes. British Journal of Psychiatry, 
150, 98-103. 
Craik, E I. M., & Tulving, E. (1975). Depth of processing and the 
retention of words in episodic memory. Journal of Experimental Psy- 
chology: General 11, 268-294. 
*Davis, H. (1979). Self-reference and the encoding of personal informa- 
tion in depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 3, 97-110. 
*Derry, P., & Kuiper, N. (1981). Schematic processing and self-refer- 
ence in clinical depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 90, 
286-297. 
Einstein, G. O., & Hunt, R. R. (1980). Levels of processsing and organi- 
zation: Additive effects of individual item and relational processing. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 
6, 588-598. 
Eysenck, M. W., & Eysenck, M. C. (1979). Processing depth, elaboration 
of encoding, memory stores, and extended capacity. Journal of Experi- 
mental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 5, 472-484. 
*Ferguson, T. J,, Rule, G. R., & Carlson, D. ( 1983 ). Memory for person- 
ally relevant information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol- 
ogy, 44, 251-261. 
Fisher, R.P., & Craik, E I. M. (1977). Interaction between encoding 
and retrieval operations in cued recall. Journal of Experimental Psy- 
chology: Human Learning and Memory, 3, 701-711. 
Fiske, S.T., & Taylor, S.E. (1991). Social cognition (2nd ed.). New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
Fong, G. T., & Markus, H. (1982). Self-schemas and judgments about 
others. Social Cognition, 1, 192-205. 
*Ganellen, R. J., & Carver, C. S. (1985). Why does self-reference pro- 
mote incidental encoding? Journal of Experimental Social Psychol- 
ogy, 21, 284-300. 
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1989). The self as a memory sys- 
tem: Powerful, but ordinary. Journal of Personality and Social Psy- 
chology, 57, 41-54. 
Greenwald, G. T., & Pratkanis, A. R. (1984). The self. In R. S. Wyer & 
T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition (Vol. 3, pp. 129- 
178). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
*Halpin, J. A., Puff, R., Mason, H. E, & Marston, S. P. (1984). Self- 
reference ncoding and incidental recall by children. Bulletin of the 
Psychonomic Society, 22, 87-89. 
Hedges, L. V., & Olkin, I. (1985). Statistical methods for meta-analysis. 
New York: Academic Press. 
Higgins, E. T., & Bargh, J. A. (1987). Social cognition and social per- 
ception. Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 369-425. 
*Hull, J. G., Van Treuren, R. R., Ashford, S.J., Propson, P., & Andrus, 
B.W. (1988). Self-consciousness and the processing of self-relevant 
information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 452- 
465. 
Hunt, R. R., & Einstein, G. O. (1981). Relational and item-specific n- 
formation in memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behav- 
ior, 20, 497-514. 
Hunt, R. R., & McDaniel, M. A. (1993). The enigma of organization 
and distinctiveness. Journal of Memory and Language, 32, 421-445. 
Hunt, R. R., & Seta, C. E. (1984). Category effects in recall: The roles 
of relational and individual item recall. Journal of Experimental Psy- 
chology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 3, 454-464. 
James. W. (1890). The principles of psychology. New York: Holt. 
Johnson, B.T. (1989). DSTAT: Software for the meta-analytic review 
of research literatures. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Johnson, B.T., & Eagly, A. H. (1989). The effects of involvement on 
persuasion: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 106, 290-314. 
*Katz, A. N. (1987). Self-reference in the encoding of creative-relevant 
traits. Journal of Personality, 55, 97-120. 
Keenan, J. M. (1993). An exemplar model can explain Klein and Loftus' 
results. In 1". K. Srull & R. S. Wyer (Eds.), Advances in social cogni- 
tion (VoL 5, pp. 69-78). New York: Erlbaum. 
*Keenan, J. M., & Baillet, S.D. (1980). Memory for personally and 
socially significant events. In R. S. Nickerson (Ed.), Attention and 
performance (Vol. 8, pp. 651-669). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
*Keenan, J. M., Golding, J. M., & Brown, E (1992). Factors controlling 
the advantage of self-reference over other-reference. Social Cognition, 
10, 79-94. 
*Kendzierski, D. (1980). Self-schemata and scripts: The recall of self- 
referent and scriptal information. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 6, 23-29. 
Kihlstrom, J. E (1993). What does the self look like? In T. K. Srull & 
R. S. Wyer (Eds.), Advances in social cognition (VoL 5, pp. 79-90). 
New York: Eflbanm. 
Klhlstrom, J, E, Cantor, N., Albright, J. S., Chew, B. R., Klein, S. B., & 
Niedenthal, P.M. (1988). Information processing and the study of 
the self. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social 
psychology (Vol. 21, pp. 145-180). New York: Academic Press. 
*Klein, S. B., & Kihlstrom, J. E (1986). Elaboration, organization, and 
the self-reference effect in memory. Journal of Experimental Psychol- 
ogy: General 115, 26-38. 
*Klein, S. B., & Loftus, J. (1988). The nature of self-referent encoding: 
The contribution of elaborative and organizational processes. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 5-11. 
Klein, S. B., & Loftus, J. (1993). The mental representation f trait and 
autobiographical knowledge about the self. In T.K. Srull & R. S. 
Wyer (Eds.), Advances in social cognition (Vol. 5, pp. 1-49). New 
York: Erlbaum. 
*Klein, S. B., Loftus, J., & Burton, H. (1989). Two self-reference ef- 
fects: The importance of distinguishing between self-descriptiveness 
394 SYMONS AND JOHNSON 
judgments and autobiographical retrieval in self-referent encoding. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 853-865. 
Klein, S. B., Loftus, J., & Schell, T. (1994). Repeated testing: A tech- 
nique for assessing the roles of elaborative and organizational pro- 
cessing in the representation f social knowledge. Journal of Person- 
ality and Social Psychology, 5, 830-839. 
Kuiper, N.A. (1982). Processing personal information about well- 
known others and the self: The use of efficient cognitive schemata. 
Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science, 14, 1 - 12. 
*Kuipet; N. A., & Derry, E (1982). Depressed and nondepressed content 
in self-reference in mild depressives. Journal of Personality, 50, 62-74. 
*Kuiper, N. A., & MacDonald, M. R. (1982). Self and other perception 
in mild depressives. Social Cognition, 1, 223-239. 
*Kuiper, N. A., 0linger, L. J., MacDonald, M. R., & Shaw, B. E (1985). 
Self-schema processing of depressed and nondepressed content: The 
effects of vulnerability to depression. Social Cognition, 3, 77-93. 
*Kuiper, N. A., & Rogers, T. B. (1979). Encoding of personal informa- 
tion: Self-other differences. Journal of Personality and Social Psy- 
chology, 37, 499-514. 
Lewis, M.Q. (1971). Categorized lists and cued recall. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 87, 129-131. 
*Lord, C. G. (1980). Schemas and images as memory aids: Two modes 
of processing social information. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 38, 257-269. 
*Lord, C. G. (1987). Imagining self and others: Reply to Brown, Kee- 
nan, and Potts (1986). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
38, 445-450. 
Maddi, S. R. (1989). Personality theories: A comparative analysis (5th 
ed.). Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole. 
Maki, R.H., & Carlson, A. K. (1993). Knowledge of the self: Is it 
special? In T. K. Srull & R. S. Wyer (Eds.), Advances in social cogni- 
tion (Vol. 5, pp. 101-110). New York: Erlbaum. 
*Maki, R. H., & McCaul, K. D. (1985). The effects of self-reference 
versus other reference on the recall of traits and nouns. Bulletin of 
the Psychonomic Society, 23, 169-172. 
Mandler, G. (1967). Organization and memory. In K. W. Spence & J. T. 
Spence (Eds.), The psychology of learning and motivation (Vol. 1, 
pp. 327-373). New York: Academic Press. 
Markus, H. (1977). Self-schemata and processing information about he 
self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 63-78. 
Markus, H., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications 
for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98, 
224-253. 
Markus, H., & VV~rf, E. (1987). The dynamic self-concept: A social 
psychological perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 299- 
337. 
*McCaul, K. D., & Maki, R. H. (1984). Self-reference v rsus desirabil- 
ity ratings and memory for traits. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 47, 953-955. 
*Mogg, K., Mathews, A., & Weinman, J. (1987). Memory bias in clini- 
cal anxiety. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 96, 94-98. 
Mueller, J. H., Bailis, K. L., & Goldstein, A. G. (1979). Depth of pro- 
cessing and anxiety in facial recognition. British Journal of Psychol- 
ogy, 70, 511-515. 
Mueller, J., Heesacker, M., & Ross, M. (1984). Body-image conscious- 
ness and self-reference effects in face recognition. British Journal of 
Social Psychology, 23, 277-279. 
*Mueller, J. H., Thompson, W. B., & Grove, T. R. (1991, May). Self- 
referent processing and hemisphericity. Paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, IL. 
*Mueller, J. H., Wonderlich, S., & Dugan, K. (1986). Self-referent pro- 
cessing of age-specific material. Psychology and Aging, 1, 293-299. 
*Myers, J. E, Lynch, P.B., & Bakal, D.A. (1989). Dysthymic and 
hypomanic self-referent effects associated with depressive illness and 
recovery. Cognitive Theory and Research, 13, 195-209. 
Ostergaard, A. L. (1992). A method for judging measures of stochastic 
dependence: Further comments on the current controversy. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 18, 
413-420. 
PsycLIT [Database]. (1974-1994, June). Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association [Producer]. Available from: SilverPlatter 
[Distributor]. 
*Pullyblank, J., Bisanz, J., Scott, C., & Champion, M. A. (1985). Devel- 
opmental invariance in the effects of functional self-knowledge on 
memory. Child Development, 56, 1447-1454. 
Reeder, G.D., McCormick, C.B., & Esselman, E.D. (1987). Self- 
referent processing and recall of prose. Journal of Educational Psy- 
chology, 79, 243-248. 
*Register, P. A., & Kihlstrom, J. E (1987). Hypnotic effects on hyper- 
mnesia. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 
35(3), 155-170. 
*Rogers, T. B., Kuiper, N.A., & Kirker, W.S. (1977). Self-reference 
and the encoding of personal information. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 35, 677-688. 
Ross, L., & Nisbett, R. E. (1991). Theperson and the situation: Per- 
spectives of social psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
*Schmeck, R.R., & Meier, S.T. (1984). Self-reference as a learning 
strategy and learning style. Human Learning, 3, 9-17. 
Sedikides, C., Olsen, N., & Reis, H. T. (1993). Relationships as natural 
categories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 71-82. 
Sherif, C. W., Sherif, M., & Nebergall, R. E. (1965). Attitude and atti- 
tude change: The social judgment-involvement approach. Philadel- 
phia: Saunders. 
Sherif, M., & Cantril, H. (1947). The psychology of ego-involvements: 
Social attitudes and identifications. New York: Wiley. 
Singer, J. L., & Kolligan, J., Jr. (1987). Personality: Developments in 
the study of private experience. Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 
533-574. 
Storms, M. D. (1973). Videotape and the attribution process: Reversing 
actors' and observers' points of view. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 27, 165-175. 
*Sutton, L.J., Teasdale, J. D., & Broadbent, D.E., (1988). Negative 
self-schema: The effects of induced epressed mood. British Journal 
of Clinical Psychology, 27, 188-190. 
*Symons, C. S. (1990). The role of self-schematicity in the self-refer- 
ence effect. Unpublished master's thesis, Syracuse University, Depart- 
ment of Psychology, Syracuse, NY. 
Tulving, E. (1979). Relation between encoding specificity and levels of 
processing. In L. S. Cermak & E I. M. Craik (Eds.), Levels of pro- 
cessing in human memory (pp. 405-428). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Tulving, E., & Pearlston, Z. (1966). Availability versus accessibility of 
information in memory for words. Journal of Verbal Learning and 
Verbal Behavior, 5, 381-391. 
Tulving, E., & Thompson, D. M. (1973). Encoding specificity and re- 
trieval processes inepisodic memory. Psychological Review, 80, 352- 
373. 
*Warren, M. W., Hughes, A. T, & Tobias, S. B. (1985). Autobiographi- 
cal elaboration and memory for adjectives. Perceptual and Motor 
Skills, 60( 1 ), 55-58. 
*Wells, G. L., Hoffman, C., & Enzle, M. E. (1984). Self- versus other- 
referent processing at encoding and retrieval. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 10, 574-584. 
Received December 6, 1995 
Revision received June 10, 1996 
Accepted June 17, 1996 • 
